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JOHN F. DASHIELL, *Editor*

Observations on the Characteristics And Distribution of German Nazis

By

HELEN PEAK

Connecticut College

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JOHN F. DASHIELL, *Editor*
University of North Carolina

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


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This analysis is based on material collected in Germany by The Morale Division of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. The major results of the Survey have been published in the Morale Division's report, entitled "The Effects of Bombing on German Morale", Government Printing Office, 1946. The Survey was carried out under the direction of Dr. Rensis Likert, who was as-

sisted in planning and execution by Drs. Richard Crutchfield, Dorwin Cartwright, William Cochran, Herbert Hyman, Daniel Katz, David Krech, Howard Longstaff, the author, and a staff of coders and specially trained German-speaking interviewers. The writer is indebted to Dr. Likert, to the Survey and to the War Department for permission to use the material.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE CHARACTERISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION OF GERMAN NAZIS

INTRODUCTION

THROUGHOUT the war years the terms "Nazi" and "German" were used almost interchangeably in the press and by the public. It was perhaps inevitable and necessary that this should have been so during the fighting, for war is a blundering instrument which knows no distinction between its victims. It was not possible to fight part of the Germans. We fought them all and they were "Nazis". The responsibility of governing Germany has just as inevitably changed the emphasis for those who are thinking in terms of re-education. The Potsdam agreement has declared the necessity of weeding out the Nazis and in this declaration the assumption is implicit that "Germans" and "Nazis" are not wholly synonymous terms. Any information about the characteristics of those who espouse the cause and ideologies of National Socialism is then potentially useful, not only for distinguishing Nazis from other Germans, but also for understanding the complexities of this nation whose future is our responsibility.

A SURVEY OF GERMAN CIVILIANS¹

In the summer of 1945 a survey of 3700 German civilians in the British, French, and American occupation zones was conducted by the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey with the primary purpose of estimating the effects of bombing on civilian morale. Although the study was not designed to explore the psychology of Nazi reactions, the plan was

such that much relevant material emerged because attitudes toward the Nazi regime were an important aspect of morale. The interview situation was informal and many of the respondents talked at considerable length about a variety of experiences, attitudes and expectations relating to the war period and the occupation. The interviewers were trained in methods of building rapport and for the most part found the Germans eager to talk about their experiences and to lay their problems before the Americans.

In addition, information such as age, sex, marital status, locale of bombing experience, membership in the Nazi Party, religion, education, and occupation was recorded for each informant. Since the persons in the sample were interviewed intensively and were selected to represent a cross-section of the German civilian population in cities and towns, the material contains valuable information on the opinions and attitudes of the average run of Germans. The Party leaders are missing from the sample as are members of the Armed Forces, so that it is the civilian in various walks of life who tells about his wartime experiences, his hopes and fears, his loyalties and hates.

Nazis were identified by two methods. At the end of each interview the respondent was classified as "Black", "Gray" or "White" by the interviewers on the basis of the ideas expressed during the interview. Those showing no evidence of Nazi sympathies were called "White". Those expressing Nazi ideas either intentionally

¹Full details of procedure are found in the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey report, *The Effects of Bombing on German Morale*, Government Printing Office, 1946.

or unintentionally were called "Black". The "Grays" were an intermediate group.

Affiliation with Party organizations served as an independent basis of judgment. No reference was made to Party organizations until the interview was complete. By this time the interviewer had usually managed to win the confidence of the informant, who was then asked casually whether he (or she) had been a member of any Party organizations. If the reply was "yes", he was asked to identify the specific organizations to which he belonged.²

OBSERVATIONS ON THE NAZIS

The following questions will be discussed in the three Parts of the Monograph.

Part I. Distribution of Nazis in the German Population

1. Where in the German population was found the greatest proportion of persons with Nazi ideology: in which age groups, among men or women, among single or married people, Protestants or Catholics, at higher or lower economic and educational levels?

2. Was Nazi Party membership dis-

² The consistency of the judgments is discussed in Part III of this Monograph.

tributed in the same manner?

3. What light do these facts throw on factors making for susceptibility to the Nazi cause?

Part II. Attitudes at the War's End

1. Toward whom were the resentments of Germans directed: toward German leaders or the Allies? What are the evidences that Germans in general and Nazis in particular were recovering their faith in the Party?

2. Was there any tendency for resentments to become generalized; i.e., for Germans to be disillusioned with both their leaders and the Allies, and was this more characteristic of Nazis than other Germans?

3. Was there evidence that any segment of German society felt responsibility for the war?

4. Was there any difference in the political awareness of Nazis and non-Nazis?

5. Were all Nazis alike?

Part III. The Identification of Nazis

1. Did people tell the truth about Party membership?

2. How were Party membership and Nazi ideology related?

3. How consistently were people identified as having Nazi ideology?

PART I

THE DISTRIBUTION OF NAZIS IN THE GERMAN POPULATION

NO GROUP or class of Germans was wholly immune to the Nazi virus, which infected persons of all social and economic levels, men and women, individuals of all ages and in all regions. But it is important that the incidence of the disease was not the same everywhere. Some groups were markedly more susceptible than others. The discovery of areas in which the infection rate was highest throws some light on the predisposing causes of this social pathology and makes very clear the great complexity of its origins. If de-Nazification is ever to mean more than a negative policy of retributive punishment, it will be necessary to take into account the fact that different people were Nazis for different reasons. Not all can be cured by the same prescription.

SEX AND AGE

It has often been stated that the younger people in Germany embraced Nazi ideology more completely than their elders. The distribution of Party members in the early years of Nazi power clearly supported this notion. More than one-third of the membership in 1934-35

was in the age group 21-30 years.³ Although this ardent group of young Nazis is now 12 or 13 years older, it is still implied that young Germany is more Nazi than the rest.⁴ This is a reasonable notion in view of the intensity of Nazi indoctrination and its truth can be checked to some extent by observing both the distribution of Party membership and ideology by age groups in the Survey results.

Tables 1, 2, and 3 indicate the sex and age distribution in the Survey sample of persons identified as "Black", "Gray" and "White". There is surprisingly little evidence here of a greater preponderance of extreme Nazis in the younger age groups.

Only when "Black" and "Gray" are combined, does the youngest age group show more Nazis: 45 per cent "Black" and "Gray" as compared to 39, 38, and 36 per cent in the older groups. These differences, which are relatively small,⁵

³ *Partei Statistik*, 1935.

⁴ Ziemer, G. Rehabilitating Fascist youth. *Publ. Opin. Quart.* 1943-44, 7, 583-591. P. Merker. *Germany Today and Tomorrow*, 1943.

⁵ Critical ratio of differences between the group 16-29 years and the other three are: 2.2, 2.5, and 3.0.

TABLE 1
Nazi identification among men and women at different ages
(Percentages)

| | 10-20 yrs. | | 30-39 yrs. | | 40-49 yrs. | | 50-70 yrs. | |
|---------------|------------|-------|------------|-------|------------|-------|------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Black | 10 | 10 | 10 | 8 | 5 | 9 | 9 | 7 |
| Gray | 26 | 37 | 26 | 32 | 20 | 33 | 30 | 28 |
| White | 64 | 53 | 64 | 60 | 66 | 58 | 61 | 65 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases* | (112) | (519) | (173) | (503) | (358) | (508) | (743) | (584) |

* The total number of cases reported in the following tables varies. At times this is because only part of the categories are reported. The number of persons for whom information was available also varies somewhat from table to table.

are contributed chiefly by the women in the sample.

It must be recalled that the sample did not include members of the Armed

TABLE 2
Nazi identification among young and old
(Percentages)

| | 10-29 yrs. | 30-39 yrs. | 40-49 yrs. | 50-70 yrs. |
|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Black | 10 | 9 | 7 | 8 |
| Gray | 35 | 30 | 31 | 29 |
| White* | 55 | 61 | 62 | 63 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (031) | (076) | (866) | (1327) |

* Critical ratios of difference between "White" 10-29 years and "White" in other age groups are: 1.9, 2.7, and 3.5.

Forces, with the result that the younger male groups were relatively small in size. It is difficult to judge whether those not in the Wehrmacht were likely to be any less Nazi than others of the same age and sex. Although the ardent Nazi might have been expected to enlist more often, willingness to enlist probably had little to do with determining who got into the Army. Actually, there were many complaints that loyal Nazis found it easier to obtain exemptions than did others. Among the women, who were fully represented at all age levels, it is clear that only small differences exist between age groups. Older Germans, therefore, seem to have held Nazi viewpoints only slightly less often than the young and it is even possible that the differences that do occur are due in part to the presence of a greater number of passive and indifferent people among the more mature.

As already indicated, the differences in men and women are small but, such as they are, show a slightly higher proportion of Nazis among the young women, again if "Grays" are counted as Nazi.

The picture is quite different when membership in Party organizations is the criterion of Naziness. Table 1 actually shows some increase in membership with age. It is true that persons were classified as "members" only when they stated they were members of adult organizations; the *Hitler Jugend* and *Bund Deutscher*

TABLE 3
Nazi identification among men and women
(Percentages)

| | Men | Women |
|--------------|--------|--------|
| Black | 8 | 8 |
| Gray | 29 | 33 |
| White* | 63 | 59 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (1386) | (2114) |

* The critical ratio of difference between percentages of men and women who are "White" equals 2.3.

Maedel members were not counted.⁶ Convinced Nazis would have been expected, however, to join adult Party groups at the first opportunity, and a failure to do so suggests a lack of enthusiasm.

This rather surprising result must reflect in part the impact of the severe pressures felt by established persons to

⁶ Membership in these organizations was not counted because it had become practically compulsory and therefore not discriminative. These were the youth organizations for boys and girls respectively. It is not certain at what age membership in each of the adult Nazi organizations became possible. For NSDAP the minimum age was 18. The inclusion of the 16 and 17 year olds may reduce spuriously the percentage of those belonging to Party organizations in the 16-29 age group. Unfortunately the 16-17 year group could not be removed directly because all persons 16 through 19 years of age were given the same code. If, however, it is assumed that half the 16-19 year group were 16 and 17 years of age and this number is subtracted from the total in the 16-29 group, the remaining group 18-29 still shows a smaller percentage of persons belonging to Party organizations than in any other age group. Percentages belonging: 18-29, 11%; 30-39, 16%; 40-49, 21%; 50-75, 21%.

join some Party organization. There would be more such people in the older age groups who would find it advantageous to join in order to escape the consequences of Party wrath. This increase in membership with age is true

family, discounting family loyalties and emphasizing the prior claims of State and Party. Loyalty to Nazi ideals might thus have been a factor in delaying marriage for those who were won to the Party before reaching marriageable age.

TABLE 4
Membership in party organizations among young and old of each sex
(Percentages)

| | 16-29 yrs. | | 30-39 yrs. | | 40-49 yrs. | | 50-70 yrs. | |
|--------------|------------|-------|------------|-------|------------|-------|------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Members | 14 | 11 | 25 | 13 | 30 | 15 | 30 | 16 |
| Not members* | 86 | 89 | 75 | 87 | 70 | 85 | 70 | 84 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (112) | (525) | (174) | (502) | (365) | (504) | (717) | (572) |

* Critical ratios of difference between the age group 16-29 and succeeding age groups:

Men: 2.6, 4.0, 4.3.
Women: 1.0, 2.0, 2.5.

for men and women, for single and married, for Protestants and Catholics, and for all educational and all occupational groups, except among semi- and unskilled workmen where there is no systematic change in membership with age. This may mean that the older men in this labor group did not have to join the Party organizations to protect their interests as often as did those in higher-income groups.

At all age levels and in all other groups, more men than women belonged to Nazi organizations. This evidently does not mean less sympathy with Nazi ideas among women, but less active participation in any outside activities and less pressure to join Party organizations.

MARRIAGE STATUS

Certain characteristics of Nazi doctrine and of the organization would lead to the expectation that marriage might be less common among persons with Nazi sympathies. In the first place, the Party doctrine has played down the role of the

Equally important is the probability that some single persons avoided marriage because of immature emotional development which, at the same time, made them susceptible to the appeals of a movement offering, among other things, the security of identification with a group of great prestige, and numerous outlets for sadistic needs to dominate and suppress others (non-Aryans, Communists, etc.). The romantic and idealistic trappings of the movement were also calculated to appeal to relatively immature personalities.⁷

The following tables confirm the expectation that there should be proportionately more persons with non-Nazi attitudes among the married groups, and this is true at all age levels as well as for the totals over all ages.

The fact that the percentage of non-Nazis who married is higher at all age levels suggests the operation of the sec-

⁷ This does not refer principally to the immaturity of youth but to emotional immaturity at any chronological age.

TABLE 5
Nazi identification among married and single persons
of different ages
(Percentages)

| | 16-29 yrs. | | 30-39 yrs. | | 40-49 yrs. | | 50-75 yrs. | |
|--------------|------------|--------|------------|--------|------------|--------|------------|--------|
| | Married | Single | Married | Single | Married | Single | Married | Single |
| Black | 9 | 10 | 8 | 12 | 7 | 12 | 8 | 13 |
| Gray | 30 | 38 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 36 | 29 | 28 |
| White* | 61 | 52 | 63 | 49 | 62 | 52 | 63 | 59 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (195) | (415) | (544) | (108) | (715) | (88) | (1074) | (101) |

* The critical ratios of difference between percentages of single and married "Whites" in each age group follow: 16-29 (2.1); 30-39 (2.6); 40-49 (1.8); 50-75 (0.8). Though these ratios are small, the consistency of their direction is significant.

ond of the two factors mentioned above. The people now 40 and over would have reached marriageable age long before Nazi doctrine became generally popular. Therefore, any correlation between single status and Nazi ideology in these persons must be due to certain of their characteristics which made them embrace Nazi ideas, rather than to the direct effect of being a Nazi on the decision to stay single. The fact that the largest differences between married and single (in percentage of non-Nazis) appear in the 30-39 year age group suggests, moreover, that both factors are operating here. This is the group which would have been 17 to 27 years of age when the Nazis came to power. In this age range there would have been some who did not marry because of personality characteristics which at once made them receptive to Nazi doctrine and resistant to marriage. At the same time, competing interest in Party work and doctrine would have been operating and would have continued to operate to reinforce avoidance of marriage.

An analysis has been made to determine whether the greater number of women in the sample is responsible in any way for the results obtained. The

differences between the proportion of Nazis among single and married persons persist when men and women are analyzed separately.

Evidence will be presented later to show that a greater proportion of Protes-

TABLE 6
Nazi identification among married and
single persons
(Percentages)

| | Single | Married |
|--------------|--------|---------|
| Black | 11 | 8 |
| Gray | 36 | 30 |
| White* | 53 | 62 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (742) | (2621) |

* The critical ratio of the difference in percentages between the single and married non-Nazis is 5.2.

tants than Catholics were Nazi sympathizers, and it will be suggested that this difference stems in part from factors related to emotional needs. When the proportion of Nazis is observed among single and married persons of different religious outlook, it becomes clear how these factors, whatever they are, summate to increase the number of persons who seem to resort to outlets in Nazi sympathy. To be both Protestant and single

TABLE 7
Nazi identification among married and
single men and women
(Percentages)

| | Single | | Married | |
|--------------|--------|-------|---------|--------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Black | 11 | 11 | 8 | 7 |
| Gray | 31 | 37 | 29 | 31 |
| White | 58 | 52 | 63 | 62 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (157) | (548) | (1181) | (1360) |

greatly increased the chances of being sympathetic with the Nazis, as compared to being married and Protestant, or Catholic and either married or single. On the other hand, there is relatively little difference in married and single Catholics. The effect is even clearer in the Gott Glaebiger⁸ group where a much greater percentage of the single, as compared to married, were Nazi in ideology. This interesting finding would make it appear that, for those who were Catholic, the fact of being unmarried produced less frequently an added need for whatever the Nazis had to give.

The proportion of Nazis appears to be consistently higher among single persons at all educational levels and in all occu-

* This was a non-Christian sect under the aegis of the Nazis.

pational groups for which the sample contained a sufficient number to warrant comparisons between married and unmarried persons.

The facts are again quite different when Naziness is judged by Party membership. In this case, the married show, on the whole, a higher proportion of affiliation with Party organizations than do the single. There are only three exceptions: (1) The 16-29 year married do not differ from 16-29 year unmarried; (2) more of the 30-39 year single than married people are identified with Party organizations but this difference is not reliable; (3) the same percentages of married and single women joined up.

The greater tendency of married people to join the Party in spite of less frequent Nazi ideology provides another bit of evidence to support the notion that, in some cases, influences over and above Nazi sympathies were at work in determining membership, for the result is completely consistent with the idea that social pressures have been operating. Although it is assumed that more single than married people needed Nazism psychologically and joined for that reason, a greater number of married people might have been expected to join for reasons of expediency. They presumably had

TABLE 8
Nazi identification among married and single persons
of different religions
(Percentages)

| | Protestant | | Catholic | | Gott Glaebiger | |
|--------------|------------|---------|----------|---------|----------------|---------|
| | Single | Married | Single | Married | Single | Married |
| Black* | 14 | 9 | 5 | 4 | 53 | 21 |
| Gray | 40 | 31 | 31 | 26 | 15 | 40 |
| White | 46 | 60 | 64 | 70 | 32 | 39 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (392) | (1474) | (276) | (895) | (19) | (96) |

* Critical ratios of difference between "Blacks" are: single vs married Protestants (2.6); single vs. married Catholics (0.4); single vs. married Glaebiger (2.6).

greater personal and property stakes in the *status quo*, fearing for the fate of the family. If this analysis is correct, the greater pressures of expediency felt by married people have outweighed the stronger influences of psychological need in the single, so that a greater proportion of married people actually joined the Party organizations.

The exceptions to the relation of marital status and Party membership constitute further evidence on this point. The young married and unmarried show no difference in tendency to join. The prob-

biger.⁹ This order is maintained in all comparisons between religious groups, in all age groups, for both sexes, in all occupations, for married and single, for all levels of education, and in all regions.

The incompatibility of Christian ethics and Nazi values certainly prevented some persons, both Protestants and Catholics, from accepting National Socialist ideologies. Although the greater resistance of the Catholics resulted from a variety of factors, it is hard to escape the conclusion that it stemmed in no small part from a difference in the extent

TABLE 9
Membership in party organizations among married and single
of different ages
(Percentages)

| | 16-20 yrs. | | 30-39 yrs. | | 40-49 yrs. | | 50-70 yrs. | |
|--------------|------------|--------|------------|--------|------------|--------|------------|--------|
| | Married | Single | Married | Single | Married | Single | Married | Single |
| Members* | 12 | 12 | 16 | 20 | 23 | 14 | 25 | 20 |
| Not members | 88 | 88 | 84 | 80 | 77 | 86 | 75 | 80 |
| Total 1% | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (195) | (422) | (541) | (101) | (711) | (93) | (1033) | (105) |

* Critical ratios of difference between married and single in each age group are: 16-20 (0.0); 30-39 (1.0); 40-49 (2.3); 50-70 (1.2).

lems of family and status were less important here. Similarly, there is little difference in married and single women. Here, again, women in general were less subject to penalties for not joining.

RELIGION

It has long been known that some of the clergy in German churches resisted the Nazi movement. There has also been evidence that Catholics cooperated with the movement less than Protestants. It is interesting to observe the extent to which church members were identified as Nazis.

The groups fall into the following order on the basis of proportion of non-Nazis: Catholics with the most, followed by Atheists, Protestants, and Gott Glaue-

to which the Catholic and Protestant Churches managed to satisfy certain psychological needs of the insecure and obedient German people.

Fromm¹⁰ and others have emphasized the role of insecurity in the psychology of Nazism. Persons reared in the authoritarian family, which is common in Germany, typically find greatest security and satisfaction in the situation where they are dominated by superior authority on the one hand, and where they can, on the other, "lord it" over someone else of lower status. It is a familiar fact that

⁹ The Gott-Glauebiger are the non-Christian sect under the aegis of the Nazis.

¹⁰ Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*, Farrar and Rinehart, 1941.

TABLE 10
Nazi identification among persons with
different religious affiliations
(Percentages)

| | Protes- tant | Cath- olic | Gott Glau- biger | Atheist |
|--------------|-----------------|---------------|------------------------|---------|
| Black | 10 | 4 | 25 | 13 |
| Gray | 33 | 27 | 37 | 19 |
| White* | 57 | 69 | 38 | 68 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (2033) | (1265) | (122) | (47) |

* Critical ratios of these differences in percentage of "Whites" are: Protestant-Catholic (7.0); Protestant-Gott Glaebiger (4.2); Protestant-Atheist (1.6).

factors such as the downfall of the monarchy, economic disaster, and the general social and moral disruption following the first World War, resulted in the breakdown of many of the status relationships and the symbols of authority in Germany.

It is understandable, in such a situation, that many should find a stabilizing influence in the authoritarian structure of the Catholic Church, its definitely prescribed relationships between clergy and people, its unchanging ritual, its close contact with many phases of the individual's life in schools, politics and community affairs, its very size and power. On the other hand, the Protestant Church, by freeing the individual of its domination¹¹ has left him relatively more responsible for steering his own course in his relations not only with his God but with the world. This is often regarded as a privilege and a right when the social order is stable. In a disrupted society, however, freedom may seem to many mere purposelessness and psychological chaos. It is reasonable, then, that a great number of Germans, and more Protestants than Catholics, should have found

solace in submission to a Fuehrer who left little to individual choice and mapped a clear course to salvation. It is an interesting question whether members of Protestant churches would have been more susceptible than Catholics to a fascist appeal in a nation where submission to authority was a less common national trait and where more individuals had been taught to stand on their own feet.

There were evidently other factors in the picture, not the least important of which was the contrast in the official attitudes of the Catholic and Protestant Churches. The Lutheran Church had for many years been the official State Church and obedience to the State was one of its basic tenets. Though certain Protestant clergy took a stand against the Nazis, the Protestant Church as a whole did not do so. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, was not committed by tradition to obedience to the German State. Its loyalties lay rather in the Vatican, which resisted interference with the Church and its activities, and consequently condemned the Nazis officially. This official attitude was of course reflected in the clergy and through them to the obedient laity. This was undoubtedly the source of some of the Catholic resistance to the Nazis.

The Atheists show slightly more extreme Nazis¹² than do the Catholics but about the same proportion of non-Nazis. The Atheists are, of course, a very special group and such a small one (between one and two per cent of the sample) that detailed analysis is not possible. It is safe to assume, however, that many of them have been accustomed to resisting, both from rational and irrational mo-

¹¹ See Fromm, *ibid.*

¹² Critical ratio of difference in percentages is 1.9 (significant at the .06 level).

TABLE 11
Party membership among the educated and uneducated
of different religions
(Percentages)

| | Elementary school | | Vocational school | | High school | | University | |
|--------------|-------------------|--------|-------------------|-------|-------------|-------|------------|-------|
| | Cath. | Prot. | Cath. | Prot. | Cath. | Prot. | Cath. | Prot. |
| Members* | 12 | 17 | 18 | 22 | 21 | 27 | 20 | 30 |
| Not members | 88 | 83 | 82 | 78 | 79 | 73 | 71 | 70 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (788) | (1244) | (245) | (209) | (184) | (388) | (50) | (100) |

* Critical ratios of differences between Catholics and Protestants follow:

Elementary School—3.1

High School—1.6

Vocational School—1.2

University—0.01

tives, the appeals of majority attitudes and mass psychology. It is not surprising, therefore, to find a large proportion of them standing up against Nazi ideology.

The results are essentially the same when Nazis are identified by Party membership, for fewer Catholics than Protestants belonged to Party organizations. It is significant, however, that the effect of religious affiliation became less important under pressures of expediency. There is, for example, little difference in percentages of Party affiliates when Catholic and Protestant college graduates are compared, or when Protestant executives and professionals are compared with Catholics in the same occupational groups. There is, however, a great

deal of difference between Protestant and Catholic elementary school graduates and between Protestant and Catholic small business men. Quite the opposite was the case when comparing the percentage of Catholic and Protestant persons with Nazi ideology. In that case the differences were greatest at highest educational and occupational levels. Once again, then, we seem to find Party membership determined not only by the factors determining Nazi ideology, but also by the very practical matter of whether it paid to join.

EDUCATION

One of the most striking findings about the distribution of Nazis in the German population is the fact that the

TABLE 12
Nazi identification by religion and education
(Percentages)

| | Elementary school | | Vocational school | | High school | | University | |
|--------------|-------------------|--------|-------------------|-------|-------------|-------|------------|-------|
| | Cath. | Prot. | Cath. | Prot. | Cath. | Prot. | Cath. | Prot. |
| Black* | 3 | 6 | 5 | 10 | 7 | 18 | 9 | 22 |
| Gray | 25 | 31 | 28 | 37 | 36 | 38 | 22 | 32 |
| White | 72 | 63 | 67 | 53 | 57 | 44 | 69 | 46 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (774) | (1243) | (239) | (303) | (180) | (382) | (64) | (96) |

* Critical ratios of differences between Catholics and Protestants follow:

Elementary School—3.3

High School—4.1

Vocational School—2.3

University—2.3

percentage of those with extreme Nazi sympathies increases with the amount of education. Similarly, the percentage "White" declines with increase in education up through the high school group. There is a slight increase in percentage

"Black" with increase in education is apparent for both men and women, for single and married persons, for Protes-

TABLE 13
Nazi identification among educated
and uneducated
(Percentages)

| | Ele- mentary | Voca- tional | High school | Uni- versity |
|--------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| Black* | 6 | 8 | 16 | 17 |
| Gray | 28 | 34 | 37 | 29 |
| White | 66 | 58 | 47 | 54 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (2132) | (588) | (610) | (175) |

* The critical ratios of percentage differences between "Blacks" are: elementary-vocational 1.7; elementary-high school 6.3; elementary-university 5.9.

of "White" at the university level. At this level fewer people fall in the intermediate category; they are more likely to be clearly Nazi or non-Nazi.

The increase in the proportion of

TABLE 15
Membership in party organizations among
educated and uneducated
(Percentages)

| | Mem- bers* | Not mem- bers | Total % | No. of cases |
|-------------------|---------------|---------------------|------------|-----------------|
| Elementary school | 16 | 84 | 100 | (2126) |
| Vocational school | 22 | 78 | 100 | (582) |
| High school | 28 | 72 | 100 | (602) |
| University | 30 | 70 | 100 | (164) |

* Critical ratios of differences between percentage of members in elementary school and vocational, 3.0; elementary and high school, 6.0; elementary and university, 4.0.

tants and Catholics, for all regions of Germany, and for all ages (see Table 14).¹³ Where there are sufficient cases for an observation, the same tendency is present within all occupational groups, except for office workers.

¹³ Unfortunately, the number of cases becomes too small to use in the university group for all except the age group 50-70 years.

TABLE 14
Nazi identification among educated and uneducated
of different ages
(Percentages)

| Age | Education | Black | Gray | White | Total % | No. of cases |
|----------------|-------------|-------|------|-------|---------|--------------|
| 16-29 years | Elementary | 7 | 36 | 57 | 100 | (283) |
| | Vocational | 7 | 39 | 54 | 100 | (101) |
| | High School | 18 | 30 | 52 | 100 | (127) |
| | University | * | * | * | | (31) |
| 30-39 years | Elementary | 5 | 28 | 67 | 100 | (371) |
| | Vocational | 10 | 30 | 60 | 100 | (128) |
| | High School | 14 | 34 | 52 | 100 | (136) |
| | University | * | * | * | | (37) |
| 40-49 years | Elementary | 5 | 30 | 65 | 100 | (575) |
| | Vocational | 6 | 32 | 62 | 100 | (111) |
| | High School | 15 | 39 | 46 | 100 | (135) |
| | University | * | * | * | | (40) |
| 50-70 years | Elementary | 5 | 25 | 70 | 100 | (801) |
| | Vocational | 9 | 33 | 58 | 100 | (154) |
| | High School | 16 | 42 | 42 | 100 | (209) |
| | University | 20 | 30 | 50 | 100 | (66) |

* Less than 50 cases.

Substantially the same pattern is found when Party membership is analyzed by educational groups. The more education a German had, the more likely he was to belong to Party organizations (Table 15). This is true for single and married people, for all age levels, for Protestants and Catholics, and for all occupational groups except, again, office workers.

It is not completely clear why the relationship between education and membership breaks down only for office workers, why the uneducated office worker was just as likely to join Party organizations as the educated. Since the same thing appears when the analysis is in terms of Nazi identification, a plausible explanation is that people from this group who entered the Party organizations did so principally because the Party had a special appeal; that status given by education did not have a differential influence. Such a supposition fits very well with the familiar fact that, in its early days, the Nazi Party and its program found an eager following among white-collar workers. The educated and the uneducated in this group were equally insecure in the depression period, and this fact may be reflected in the present results. Moreover, since the white-collar workers tended to identify themselves with the upper classes, this class consciousness, exaggerated perhaps in a group that was none too secure, may have also been a factor in acceptance by both the educated and less educated of the reactionary doctrines of Nazism.

For all other groups the more highly educated not only joined the Party organizations more frequently but they more often revealed loyalty to the Party in their statements and attitudes. To some extent, the militaristic and nationalistic traditions of German university life must have played a part in making

Nazi concepts acceptable to many of those who grew up in those traditions. In addition, it appears that education had become for many people a badge of special class and privileged status, with the attendant attitudes of superiority and prejudice against various kinds of inferior beings. Such a frame of mind is, of course, the ideal culture-medium for Fascism.

Moreover, the fact that education is related to status, both social and economic, means that concern for the preservation of this status has almost certainly been operative in making the more educated classes fall in with the Nazis. Such persons were especially vulnerable to penalties for non-cooperation and many hoped that National Socialism would be an antidote for Communism. This interpretation was confirmed by the comments of certain respondents.

These disturbing results emphasize the fact that education, as such, is not necessarily a force for democracy. Nor is this finding an indictment only of Nazi education, for the increase in Nazi sympathy with increase in education was just as marked in the people 50 to 70 years of age as in the younger groups. It means that every nation aspiring to be democratic has not only the problem of avoiding the development of psychologically insecure classes who will seek solace in the proposals of any rabble rouser which offers them strength through joy, but that they must also see to it that somehow the "best" people and the most educated do not identify their interests narrowly with reactionary and fascist movements and thereby become the destroyers of democracy.

PRE-WAR OCCUPATION OF CHIEF WAGE EARNER

Table 16 indicates that the professional and executive groups contained

TABLE 16
Nazi identification in occupational groups
(Percentages)

| | Black | Gray | White | Totals % | No. of cases |
|----------------------------|-------|------|-------|----------|--------------|
| Semi and unskilled workers | 4 | 29 | 67 | 100 | (494) |
| Skilled workers | 5 | 27 | 68 | 100 | (725) |
| Office workers | 9 | 34 | 57 | 100 | (420) |
| Small-businessmen | 10 | 32 | 58 | 100 | (259) |
| Farmers | 14 | 26 | 60 | 100 | (65) |
| Professionals | 14 | 36 | 50 | 100 | (176) |
| Executives and Managers | 17 | 39 | 44 | 100 | (253) |
| Students | 13 | 37 | 50 | 100 | (328) |
| Miscellaneous | 6 | 27 | 67 | 100 | (281) |
| Unemployed | 3 | 22 | 75 | 100 | (68) |

the highest percentage of Nazis, with farmers, office workers and small business men next in order. Skilled and unskilled labor groups revealed the lowest percentages of Nazis. Student groups fell between office workers and professionals.

Occupational groups showing similar percentages have been combined in the following table for purposes of statistical comparison.

The ranks of the occupational groups in terms of percentage of Nazis remain practically the same at the different levels of education. The combined effects of education and occupation are seen when those persons are selected who were skilled or unskilled workers with either elementary or vocational school educations and compared with a group composed of executives, managers and professionals with either high school or university educations.

As already indicated, each respondent

was asked to report the pre-war occupation of the breadwinner in his family. This means that when Nazi identification is studied within occupational groups, there are cases where the occupational classification is the husband's and Nazi identification the wife's or that of some other individual in the family. It is safe to assume that this does not result in any serious distortion of the relation between occupation and Nazi identification because there is every reason to believe that, in most German families, the wife would reflect the political attitudes of her husband. She would rarely take an independent course in these matters. Probably the major difference in this respect would be found in the number of women as against men who were identified as passive and indifferent on political matters. The effect of this procedure can be checked, however, by comparing the relative number of Nazis in different

TABLE 17
Nazi identification in occupational groups
(Percentages)

| | Black | Gray | White* | Total % | No. of cases |
|--------------------------------------|-------|------|--------|---------|--------------|
| Skilled and unskilled workers | 5 | 28 | 67 | 100 | (1219) |
| Office workers and small businessmen | 10 | 33 | 57 | 100 | (676) |
| Students | 13 | 37 | 50 | 100 | (328) |
| Professionals and executives | 16 | 38 | 46 | 100 | (429) |

* Critical ratios of difference in percentages of "Whites" follow: Skilled-unskilled workers vs. office workers and small business (4.3); office workers-small business vs. professional and executive (3.7); office workers-small business vs. students (2.2); skilled-unskilled workers vs. professional and executives (7.8).

TABLE 18
Nazi identification as affected by education and occupation
(Percentages)

| | Black | Gray | White* | Total % | No. of cases |
|---|-------|------|--------|---------|--------------|
| Skilled-unskilled with elementary or vocational education | 3 | 29 | 68 | 100 | (1131) |
| Professional-executive with high school or university education | 17 | 39 | 44 | 100 | (258) |

* The critical ratio of the percentage differences in "Whites," 8.6.

occupational groups when the information comes from men and when it is obtained from women respondents. When men are the informants they are, as a rule, classified by their own occupations, whereas the women will often be classified by the husband's occupation. When the occupations are ranked in terms of the percentage of Nazis, the correlation resulting from a comparison of the data furnished by men and women is $+.92$.¹⁴ Thus practically identical results are obtained from men and women.

The occupations fall into essentially the same pattern in terms of Party membership. Those occupations showing highest percentages "Black" are the ones with the highest percentage of people belonging to some Party organization. The only exceptions are students and the miscellaneous group.

These results, like those on education, reveal the higher economic levels of the German population as both more frequently active in Party organizations and more often sympathetic with Party attitudes than people at lower levels. Indeed for the present sample, occupational level produced greater differences in percentages of Nazis than did any other variable.

The interpretation of the results on education is relevant here, for both education and occupation are related to

status and to vested interests that must be protected. It might be objected, however, that the higher percentage of Nazis among professionals and executives is a result of the fact that those with Nazi sympathies were elevated to these positions because of such loyalties and that the people who originally held the top

TABLE 19
Membership in party organizations by
occupational groups
(Percentages)

| | Members | Not members | Total % | No. of cases |
|----------------------------|---------|-------------|---------|--------------|
| Skilled workers | 20 | 80 | 100 | (411) |
| Semi and unskilled workers | 13 | 87 | 100 | (492) |
| Office workers | 21 | 79 | 100 | (734) |
| Small business | 26 | 74 | 100 | (256) |
| Farmers | 26 | 74 | 100 | (66) |
| Professionals | 32 | 68 | 100 | (166) |
| Executives and managers | 39 | 61 | 100 | (237) |
| Students | 12 | 88 | 100 | (333) |
| Miscellaneous | 16 | 84 | 100 | (283) |
| Unemployed | 12 | 88 | 100 | (69) |

positions were not necessarily more susceptible to Nazism. This is, without question, an important factor.

A partial control on this point has been introduced to determine whether the occupations keep the same rank in Naziness when non-government workers only are analyzed. One-third of the original sample was selected at random and the pre-war occupation reported was classified as a government or non-government job. This had been indicated on

¹⁴ Farmers and the unemployed were omitted in obtaining these correlations because the numbers were too small to break by sex.

the original schedules. Government employees, such as school teachers, judges, government engineers and doctors, railroad workers, government clerical workers, and others, were eliminated from the sample. These are all areas in which the Nazis had complete control from the start and where Party loyalty did serve as an important qualification for a job.

The following table reports the percentages of those who were non-Nazi in various occupations, (1) in the total sample, (2) in the sub-sample of almost 1300 cases, and (3) among the non-government workers in the sub-sample. Small differences in percentage appear between the total sample and sub-sample but the occupations maintain the same relative positions except that the total sample shows fewest non-Nazis among

employees, except in the managerial and executive classes. Despite this change, the occupations with higher status continue to show the lowest percentage of non-Nazis, the most Nazis.

This method of attempting to rule out the effects of Nazi favors to the loyal is probably least effective with the executive and managerial group. Indeed, the results show no change when government employees are excluded from this category. The data cannot really be controlled on this point, for even before the war started the Nazis had placed many of the loyal Nazis in positions of power. It is known from other sources, however, that many persons in the top executive jobs did go along with the Nazis, in some cases because they felt them preferable to the threat of Communism; in others because they thought the Nazis would be replaced and that it was expedient to cooperate for the time being. But many of these people did find many points in the Nazi program acceptable. They had sympathy with the idea of Germany's expansion, with her taking her place as a world power, with the anti-labor attitudes, with many other of the Nazi promises. On the other hand, the workers soon found that National Socialism was sweeping away their hard-won gains and their liberties. It is reasonable and consistent with other evidence¹⁵ that more persons in the high status occupations should have cast their lot with the Nazis.

TABLE 20

Percentage "white" in total sample and among non-government workers by occupation*

| | Percentage "white" in | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|
| | Total sample | Sub-sample all workers | Sub-sample only non-government workers |
| Executives and managerial | 44 | 48 | 46 |
| Professionals | 50 | 42 | 52 |
| Office workers | 57 | 57 | 62 |
| Small business | 58 | 62 | 62 |
| Skilled workers | 68 | 64 | 66 |
| Semi and unskilled | 67 | 64 | 66 |

* Only the major occupational groups are covered because of the small number of cases in the others.

executives and the sub-sample fewest among professionals. This difference is sufficiently small that it might well result from chance variations.

A comparison of the sub-sample, with and without government workers included, shows differences in the expected direction. There are, in general, more "White" when you leave out government

REGION

A comparison between North-North Central, Rhine-Westphalia, and the South showed no consistent differences in percentage of Nazi sympathizers.¹⁶

¹⁵ Gerthe, H. The Nazi Party: Its leadership and Composition. *Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1940, 45, 517-54.

¹⁶ The Russian zone is of course not included.

Differences are also small in terms of membership in Party organizations, with a slightly higher proportion belonging in the North-North East region than in the others (22 per cent in the North against 19 and 18 per cent in Rhine-Westphalia and the South respectively).

SUMMARY

The present analysis throws no light on the historical reasons why Germany as a nation has found fascist doctrine acceptable, while certain other nations have been more resistant. The study does, however, provide evidence of certain influences which have been working in the setting of German culture to make some groups within Germany more susceptible than others to the Nazi appeal. In other words, the question is not, "Why did National Socialism flourish in Germany?" but "Why were some Germans Nazi and others not?"

The method of analysis has involved: (1) observation of the particular groups within which Nazi sympathies were the most frequent and of those where Party membership was commonest, and (2) an attempt to subordinate these findings to a few explanatory principles.

Nazi sympathies were found to be:

(1) slightly more frequent among the young than among older peoples;

(2) slightly more frequent among women than men at the younger age levels;

(3) less common among married than among single people;

(4) less common among Catholics than among Protestants;

(5) more common among the better educated Germans of all ages;

(6) of lowest frequency among the laboring classes and highest among executives and managers (classified on the basis of pre-war occupations of the chief

wage earners). The occupations fall in the following order in terms of increasing percentage of Nazis: unskilled and skilled workers, small business men and office workers, professionals, executives and managers.

Membership in Party organizations was:

(1) more frequent among older people;

(2) more frequent among men than women;

(3) more common among married than single people;

(4) more common among Protestants than Catholics;

(5) more common among the well educated;

(6) of the same relative frequency in different occupational groups as indicated above for Nazi sympathy.

These observations are found to be consistent with the suggestion that the following influences were important in making some persons especially susceptible to the Nazi appeal. Other factors were certainly operative which are not brought out by this material.

(1) Some individuals were sympathetic with the Nazis and joined up because of pressing psychological needs.

It has always been suspected that Nazi doctrine and practice made a special appeal to the misfits, the personally insecure, the "lunatic fringe" who found refuge in the movement. This was clearly evident in the Party leadership. In the present material it is almost certainly reflected in the greater proportion of Nazi sympathizers found among single than among married persons at all age levels.

Susceptibility to Nazism was determined not only by the degree of personal insecurity in individuals but also by other available opportunities to compensate for this insecurity by identifica-

tion with strong, authoritarian movements or institutions which serve some of the same functions as Nazism. It appears that the Catholic Church may have played such a role to some extent, for the members of this Church were less often Nazi sympathizers than were Protestants and the susceptibility of even single Catholics was much less than that of single Protestants.

(2) The habitual readiness of the German people to submit to authority made certain groups accept Nazism more readily than others. Because the Lutheran Church had a long tradition of obedience to the State, it took no official stand against Nazism, although a part of the Church split off over the issue. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, officially opposed it because the Nazis interfered with Church affairs. Many of the people in these Churches obediently followed their leaders, often without evidence of conviction one way or the other. This was doubtless a further factor in the greater number of Nazi Protestants.

(3) Some individuals found it possible to be loyal to the Nazis because their identification with high status groups in German society left them with attitudes essentially undemocratic and fascist in tone. Their feelings of superiority, for example, made them sympathetic with the Nazi race doctrines. Such attitudes are likely to blind the individual to what he would normally consider the "cruder" aspects of Nazism. Moreover, members of the upper class groups in Germany, as elsewhere, often adopted fascist attitudes and ideas because their interests lay in retaining power and in maintaining the *status quo*. Though National Socialism was feared by some as a revolution, it was preferred to Communism, because it soon revealed its anti-labor and generally reactionary bias.

The findings that the percentage of Nazi sympathizers, as well as of Party members, was highest among the better educated of all ages suggests the operation of such factors. The greater frequency of Nazis in the higher occupational groups (professionals, executives and managers) is also compatible with this interpretation.

(4) It is clear in general that influences related to Nazi sympathies would also tend to encourage Party membership. There is evidence, however, in the material just reviewed, as well as in section III of this paper, that there were those without sympathy for the Party and its ideas who joined the Nazi organizations, apparently because of fear of the consequences of non-cooperation. Fear of the loss of status, of jobs, of wealth, concern for the family's welfare, all seem to have been operating to make people join. This is seen in the greater proportion of Party members among old than young, although there were fewer Nazi sympathizers among the older people, and similarly in the higher percentage of members among married when compared to single people, again in spite of the opposite finding for ideology. These same pressures are probably involved to some extent in the more frequent membership in higher educational and occupational groups, as well as in the reduced difference in the percentages of Protestants and Catholics of high status who were Party members.

Results such as these provide evidence that Party affiliation alone is a questionable method of picking out the Germans who are most Nazi in their ideas. People joined the Party organizations for many different reasons and these factors should be taken into account in selecting those who are to be restrained from interference with the re-making of Germany.

PART II

GERMAN ATTITUDES AT THE WAR'S END

IN THE study of the effects of bombing on morale it was found on every measure used that Nazis had consistently higher war-time morale than the rest of the Germans.¹⁷ In fact, identification with the Nazi Party had more to do with morale than any of the influences studied. It is clear from this same material that Nazis differed from non-Nazis in other respects. Although the information is incomplete, it does provide insight into certain of the attitude patterns of Nazis and non-Nazis which existed at the end of the war and which constituted the background for reactions to the occupation.

As a group, the "little" Nazis, like their leaders, maintained throughout the war and surrender unrealistic expectations about victory, attitudes of distrust and resentment against the Allies, a tendency to project their hatred, a belief in the justice of their cause, and despair about the future under the occupation. This is not equally true, however, of all parts of the German population, a considerable portion of which appears to have been relatively less resentful, vaguely conscious of a share in the blame, definitely cognizant of the realities of war and defeat, and mildly hopeful about the future.

These distinctions are real and definite but it should not be inferred that there is a clear-cut dividing line between Nazis and non-Nazis, for there were all shades of Naziness in the sample. The differences discussed are large when extreme groups are compared, but in all cases

there is an intermediate group (Grays) whose attitudes fall between the Nazis and the non-Nazis.

TOWARD WHOM DID GERMANS DIRECT THEIR RESENTMENT?

One of the practically important characteristics of any people is the nature and direction of its resentments. This is an especially critical matter in populations which have experienced the inflated aspirations and devastating terror of war, and the humiliation of defeat. The shocking contrasts between German hopes and the realities of defeat have inevitably generated severe psychological pressures.

The question is how the Germans have reacted to those tensions. What are the evidences of resentment and where is it focussed: on the Nazis, on the military leaders, on the conquerors, or on all together?

The Allies

It is immediately clear that the answer cannot be given for Germans as a whole and that, in the summer of 1945, there was a basically different psychological climate among those that were identified as "Black", "Gray", and "White".

At that time the "Blacks" manifested a great deal of aggressive feeling toward the Allies. This is seen both in the blame for air raids and in attitudes toward the occupation. Not only did a large proportion of Nazis (68 per cent) report that they blamed the Allies for raids but 11 per cent of them expressed bitter hate and intense anger often accompanied by cursing and abuse. In sharp contrast, only one fourth of the non-Nazis

¹⁷ U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey Report, *The Effects of Bombing on German Morale*, Government Printing Office, 1946.

("Whites") blamed the Allies for raids and between two and three per cent of them reacted with actual expressions of hate.

TABLE 21
Percentage of Nazis and non-Nazis blaming allies for air raids
(Percentages)

| | Black (Nazi) | Gray | White (Non- Nazi) | Total Sample |
|-----------------|-----------------|-------|-------------------------|-----------------|
| No blame | 16* | 39 | 59* | 48 |
| Qualified blame | 15 | 14 | 15 | 14 |
| Blame | 68 | 46 | 26 | 38 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases** | (225) | (728) | (1339) | (2292) |

* The critical ratio of the difference between percentage of "No blame" for "Black" and "White" equals 15.5. These results are based on interviews with both bombed and unbombed respondents. (Schedule B.)

** In this and other tables the percentage of interviews in which no answer was obtained to the question is omitted when it equals two per cent or less. In these tables the total number of cases again varies: first of all, part of the sample of 3700 was given one set of questions (Schedule A), and another part a different set (Schedule B). In some cases the sample is further broken into those questioned in June and those in July. These sub-samples were duplicates.

In spite of resentment of the raids, a good many Nazis had favorable comments to make about the occupation in June 1915 when they were asked, "How is it going with you under the occupa-

tion?" Even so, there were more dissatisfied Nazis than non-Nazis. By July both groups were more critical and found much to complain of, but among Nazis the trend away from favorable comment was alarming, with 72 per cent commenting favorably in June and only 42 per cent in July. The tolerant reaction of this group was evidently short-lived and unstable and by July was giving way rapidly to critical and verbally aggressive reactions. As the first shock of defeat wore off and the expectation of a ruthless occupation disappeared, these aggressive reactions began to mount. Nineteen per cent more Nazis made unfavorable comments in July than in June. The "White" and "Gray" groups were also becoming more critical but the change was much smaller.

As might be expected, the typical Nazi attitude toward the future was less optimistic at the end of the war than that of the non-Nazi and it was even less hopeful in July than in June. The question was asked, "How do you think you and your family will fare in the next three or four years?"

The answers were distributed as shown in table 23.

The decrease from June to July in clearly hopeful attitudes toward the fu-

TABLE 22
Attitudes toward occupation
(Percentages)

| | Black | | | Gray | | | White | | |
|-------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| | June | July | Diff. | June | July | Diff. | June | July | Diff. |
| Largely favorable | 72* | 42** | -30 | 78 | 59 | -19 | 84* | 75** | -9 |
| Equally favorable-unfavorable | 9 | 20 | +11 | 8 | 14 | +6 | 7 | 12 | +5 |
| Largely unfavorable | 19 | 38 | +19 | 14 | 27 | +13 | 9 | 13 | +4 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | | 100 | 100 | | 100 | 100 | |
| No. of cases | (151) | (139) | | (584) | (403) | | (1165) | (966) | |

* Critical ratio difference equals 3.2.

** Critical ratio difference equals 7.5.

TABLE 23
Attitudes toward the future
(Percentages)

| | Black | | | Gray | | | White | | |
|----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| | June | July | Diff. | June | July | Diff. | June | July | Diff. |
| Good | 26* | 13** | -13 | 36 | 23 | -13 | 42* | 32** | -10 |
| Good-bad | 8 | 9 | +1 | 9 | 9 | 0 | 12 | 12 | 0 |
| It depends | 38 | 52 | +14 | 33 | 40 | +7 | 28 | 40 | +12 |
| Bad | 10 | 23 | +13 | 13 | 12 | -1 | 10 | 7 | -3 |
| Don't know | 5 | 3 | -2 | 3 | 5 | +2 | 2 | 1 | -1 |
| No answer | 7 | 0 | -7 | 6 | 2 | -4 | 6 | 2 | -4 |
| Total Σ | 100 | 100 | | 100 | 100 | | 100 | 100 | |
| No. of cases | (151) | (130) | | (591) | (498) | | (1171) | (674) | |

* Critical ratio of difference between "White" and "Black" in June equals 4.0.

** Critical ratio of difference between "White" and "Black" in July equals 5.9.

ture was not very different in "Black" and "White" but most of the non-Nazis, who changed their view, took the attitude, "It depends." No more of them (actually fewer) were convinced in July that the future would be bad. On the other hand, seven per cent more Nazis expressed this opinion in July than in June and only one eighth expressed real hope.

It is of interest to note that the Nazis, who as a group so bitterly resented Allied bombing, are the ones who often said that the reason for the bombing was hatred of the German people. The question was asked, "In your opinion what do you think the Allies wanted to accomplish by these raids?" Of those answering this question, 12 per cent of Nazis and five per cent of non-Nazis¹⁸ said that the Allies wanted to kill the German people and destroy their civilization, because they hated the Germans. This apparent projection onto the Allies of the hatred felt by the respondents may be an example of the paranoid-like reactions which Brickner has claimed to be characteristic of German attitudes and behavior in the nation as a whole.¹⁹ Be-

fore this can actually be interpreted as projection in the usual meaning of the term, however, it would be necessary to show that those individuals, who believed in Allied hatred of the Germans, were unconscious of their own hatred of the Allies. The available information was not adequate for making this analysis.

German Leaders

The next question concerns the extent to which German leaders were also victims of popular resentment. The Survey provides evidence of changes in opinion regarding competence of military and political leaders, popular opinion as to whether German leaders in general had the best interests of the people at heart, opinions about the course events would have taken if Nazi Germany had won, and some general unsolicited comment about leadership.

Many people came to believe that the German leaders were incompetent. The military group was more trusted than the political both at the beginning and at the end of the war, but during the war there was a marked drop in confidence in all leadership. A greater number of Nazis believed in the competence of both

¹⁸ The critical ratio of this difference is 3.1.

¹⁹ Brickner, R. M. *Is Germany Incurable?* Lippincott, 1913.

military and political leaders at all times, in spite of the fact that many of them questioned the loyalty of the Army and blamed them for defeat.

TABLE 24
Change in attitudes toward political leaders
(Percentages)

| | Black | Gray | White | Total sample |
|---|-------|-------|-------|--------------|
| Loss in confidence | 42 | 44 | 25 | 33 |
| Always believed incompetent | 15 | 30 | 58 | 44 |
| Always believed competent | 30* | 7 | 1* | 6 |
| No information from respondents on change | 13 | 10 | 15 | 17 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (151) | (473) | (816) | (1440) |

* Critical ratio of difference between "Black" and "White" believing in competence is 7.8. The difference remains reliable when the "No information" group is excluded.

A judgment of incompetence does not in itself imply necessarily that the leaders were resented by the people and it is unfortunate that there were not resources for re-coding the interviews specifically for resentment against leaders. It is quite clear, however, in reading the interviews that these judgments of incompetence were most often statements of disillusionment, with definite emotional overtones of resentment. Criticism and blame of leaders for bad judgment, for failure to agree among themselves, bad diplomacy, bungling, lies and false promises, for failure to protect the German civilian were explicit and vigorous.

The respondents made another judgment about leadership which involved opinions about their intentions rather than their competence. The question was asked, "During the war did you believe that your leaders had the best interests of the people at heart?"

TABLE 25
Change in attitudes toward military leaders
(Percentages)

| | Black | Gray | White | Total sample |
|-----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|--------------|
| Loss of confidence | 60 | 69 | 65 | 65 |
| Always believed incompetent | 2 | 4 | 13 | 9 |
| Always believed competent | 33* | 15 | 9* | 14 |
| No information about change | 5 | 11 | 13 | 12 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (151) | (473) | (816) | (1440) |

* Critical ratio of difference between "Black" and "White" believing in competence is 3.5.

Here again a large proportion of Nazis was disposed to defend the intentions of Germany's rulers, while over half of the non-Nazis questioned their motives in some respect. It is clear that the war was a factor in making for doubt, for those who were bombed (both Nazis and non-Nazis) were less ready to defend their leaders than were the unbombed.

But what was the trend with the occupation? Is there evidence of any tendency to recover confidence in the Party? The question was asked, "How do you think your family would have fared in the next three or four years if Germany had won the war?"

TABLE 26
Belief that leaders had best interests
of the people at heart
(Percentages)

| | Black | Gray | White | Total sample |
|-------------------|--------------------|-------|--------------------|--------------|
| Yes (unqualified) | 76 ¹ ** | 40 | 20 ¹ ** | 35 |
| Yes (qualified) | 15* | 28 | 23 | 23 |
| Moderate no | * | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| Firm no | 8 | 22 | 55 | 40 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (209) | (676) | (1244) | (2129) |

* Less than 0.5 per cent.

** Critical ratio of difference is equal to 7.5.

TABLE 27
Attitudes toward future if Germany had won
(Percentages)

| | Black | | | Gray | | | White | | |
|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| | June | July | Diff. | June | July | Diff. | June | July | Diff. |
| Good | 50** | 58*** | +8 | 19 | 21 | +2 | 5** | 6*** | +1 |
| Good-bad | 11 | 12 | +1 | 11 | 11 | 0 | 7 | 8 | +1 |
| Depends | 0 | 1 | +1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | * | 1 | +1 |
| Bad | 24 | 20 | -4 | 55 | 56 | +1 | 81 | 80 | -1 |
| Don't know | 3 | 3 | 0 | 5 | 7 | +2 | 2 | 3 | +1 |
| No answer | 12 | 0 | -6 | 0 | 4 | -5 | 5 | 2 | -3 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | | 100 | 100 | | 100 | 100 | |
| No. of cases | (151) | (130) | | (591) | (498) | | (1171) | (974) | |

* Less than 0.5 per cent.

** Critical ratio of this difference equals 11.

*** Critical ratio of this difference equals 12.

Since German victory would evidently have been synonymous with Nazi rule, the answers reveal what appears to be confidence of a large percentage of the Nazis in the future which a victorious Germany would have provided. Only a very small percentage of non-Nazis expressed any faith in such a future. In July a few more Nazis were dreaming of what might have been, but there was no change in the "Whites". There is just a hint here that the Nazis were slipping back to their early allegiances. There was at the time of the Survey no evidence that the non-Nazis were taking the same course. The largest single group was waiting to see the course of events. They were saying, "It depends".

Another aspect of Nazi reaction has come to light in the interviews. Nazi sympathizers not only resented bombing and the occupation but they often mentioned bitterly that treason in the Army was the cause of Germany's defeat. The July 20th attempt to assassinate Hitler and the activities of the Free Germany Committee in the USSR are the most commonly cited evidence for this opinion.

The spontaneous expression of such a

viewpoint was found principally among those with Nazi leanings. In a sub-sample of interviews, which had been specially coded for attitude toward Nazism, treason against the government was mentioned in the following proportion of cases.

TABLE 28

Reference to treason as cause of defeat among those with different attitudes toward Nazism*

| | Percentage mentioning treason | Total N |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------|
| Strong Nazi identification | 25 | 44 |
| Moderate Nazi identification | 15 | 47 |
| Moderate rejection | 2 | 48 |
| Strong rejection | 3 | 36 |

* Critical ratios of difference between

Strong and moderate identification—1.2

Strong identification-moderate rejection—3.4

Strong identification-strong rejection—3.1

Generalized Resentment

It has been implied that resentment of the Allies was less likely to occur in persons who were antagonistic toward German leaders than in the loyal. Table 29 seems to justify this implication. Among Nazis and non-Nazis alike, those who

TABLE 29
Blame of Allies for raids and criticism of intentions of German leaders
(Percentages)

| | Black | | Gray | | White | |
|----------------------|---|------|---|-------|---|-------|
| | Leaders interested in people's welfare | | Leaders interested in people's welfare | | Leaders interested in people's welfare | |
| | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Did not blame allies | 12 | 40 | 33 | 52 | 44 | 69 |
| Qualified blame | 17 | 55 | 54 | 31 | 39 | 18 |
| Definite blame | 71 | 5 | 13 | 17 | 17 | 13 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (109) | (20) | (488) | (179) | (469) | (736) |

criticized German leaders²⁰ did tend to be those who were not critical of the Allies. Thus among the "Black", 71 per cent of those who said the German leaders had the best interests of the people at heart, blamed the Allies for the raids, while only five per cent of those who doubted the intentions of leaders blamed the Allies.

Expressed in terms of correlations, the relationship is moderately high: for "Black", $-.50$; for "Gray", $-.30$; for "White", $-.40$.

The present data do not make clear the reasons for this relationship. The result would be expected if it were assumed that resentment directed into one channel reduces resentment in other directions, that hating leaders reduces hate of the Allies. Whether or not there is such a dynamic relationship between various expressions of resentment, the pattern is obviously determined in part by a general attitude of acceptance or lack of acceptance of the pronouncements of German leadership. Those who tended to accept these pronouncements would at once blame the Allies and express belief in the motives of German leaders.

Other evidence supports the assumption

²⁰ In answer to the question whether the leaders had the best interests of the people at heart.

tion that some such general attitude is a factor in the pattern of resentment, for blaming the Allies is related to other reactions which are typical of the Nazi line, such as long sustained belief in victory. During the interview each respondent was asked, "What first brought you to the belief that Germany would lose the war?" The answers furnished evidence of the degree of persistence of a belief in victory. It is quite clear that those who blamed the Allies for bombing tended to be the same people who believed longest that Germany would win.

While the majority of the respondents showed this unidirectional pattern of blame (either blaming leaders or Allies), there were individuals who did not reveal either of these particular resentments and others who were disillusioned with both the Allies and the German leaders. Table 31 shows the distribution of these three patterns.

Thus only 16 per cent fell in the group that both blamed the Allies definitely or with qualifications and at the same time criticized German leaders, while 65 per cent showed the criticism-no criticism pattern of criticizing *either* leaders or Allies. Nineteen per cent found no fault with either the Allies or German leaders.

TABLE 30
Persistence of belief in victory and blame of the Allies for raids
(Percentages)

| | Lost belief in victory | | |
|--------------------|------------------------|---------------------|---------------|
| | by Jan. 1942 | Jan. 1942-Jan. 1944 | Jan. 1944-end |
| <i>Blacks</i> | | | |
| No blame of allies | 29 | 13 | 11 |
| Qualified blame | 8 | 19 | 11 |
| Definite blame | 63 | 68 | 79 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (38) | (63) | (102) |
| <i>Grays</i> | | | |
| No blame of allies | 48 | 38 | 31 |
| Qualified blame | 16 | 13 | 15 |
| Definite blame | 36 | 49 | 54 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (162) | (256) | (144) |
| <i>White</i> | | | |
| No blame of allies | 65 | 53 | 45 |
| Qualified blame | 13 | 16 | 16 |
| Definite blame | 22 | 30 | 39 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (532) | (428) | (142) |

It is significant that the non-Nazis showed a higher percentage in the generally critical group (blaming Allies and Nazis) than did Nazis: five per cent of the Blacks", 13 per cent of "Grays", and 19 per cent of "Whites" fell in this classification. At the same time the uni-directional reaction (i.e. blaming either leaders or Allies) is much more frequent in the Nazis: 84 per cent of "Blacks", 63 per cent "Grays", and 64 per cent of "Whites" reacted in this manner. It is clear, therefore, that in all groups the most common reaction was to be critical of either German leaders or the Allies. More Nazis accepted the official attitude of blaming the Allies and defending Nazi leaders. More non-Nazis criticized their leaders and not the Allies but this rejection of the Nazi leaders did not necessarily involve a shift in attitude toward

TABLE 31
Distribution of patterns of resentment
(Percentages)

| | Leaders had people's interest at heart | Leaders did not have people's interest at heart | Total |
|--------------------------|--|---|--------|
| Did not blame allies | 19 | 29 | 48 |
| Qualified blame | 28 | 10 | 38 |
| Definite blame of allies | 8 | 6 | 14 |
| Total % | 55 | 45 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (1156) | (935) | (2091) |

the Allies. Almost one-fifth of the non-Nazi group was critical of both.

DID THE GERMANS HAVE A SENSE OF GUILT?

It is not true, as sometimes alleged, that all Germans felt guiltless about Ger-

many's part in the war and the course of events under the Nazis. During the interviews a question was asked, "What in your opinion was the chief cause of the war?"

In answering this question many respondents voluntarily assigned responsibility for the war. One-third could not be rated for their opinion on war responsibility but of those who were rated, 74 per cent placed the blame in Germany; i.e., on the people, the government, or specifically on Hitler and the Nazis. One-fifth said both Germany and the Allies were to blame and six per cent implied that Germany and the Germans were in no way responsible. This is not to be taken as a census of opinion on war guilt in Germany, for the question was asked only of those in bombed communities and the information was got incidentally without extensive probing on the matter of responsibility. It does suggest, however, that a majority of German civilians did not try to shift the blame to other nations. On the other hand, it is striking that only six per cent gave any evidence of realizing that the

German people themselves had responsibility in the matter.

Here again certain striking differences appear in the responses of Nazis and non-Nazis. Although more Nazis than non-Nazis could not be rated on their feelings of responsibility,²¹ it can be said that Nazis in general showed a much greater tendency to deny Germany's responsibility for the war than did non-Nazis. Twenty per cent of "Blacks" as against two per cent of "Whites" denied that Germany had any responsibility for the war. It is very likely that this difference would be increased if ratings on a higher percentage of cases had been possible.

There is no evidence in Table 32 of the extent of feelings of personal guilt but that is reflected to some extent in in-

²¹ This was an unusual situation. On most questions the Nazis and non-Nazis showed about the same percentage of non-committal answers. It might be that some Nazis hesitated to say frankly that the Allies were to blame. If this was the reason for the higher percentage of "not ratable" responses among Nazis, it is clear that the differences here observed would be even greater if they had answered this question more often.

TABLE 32
Responsibility for the war
(Percentages)

| | Black | | Gray | | White | | Total | |
|--------------------------------------|-------|----|-------|----|-------|----|--------|----|
| German people as a whole responsible | 7 | 10 | 6 | 10 | 6 | 9 | 6 | 9 |
| German government responsible | 3 | 8 | 6 | 10 | 7 | 10 | 7 | 10 |
| Hitler or Nazis (specified) | 9 | 20 | 20 | 48 | 42 | 58 | 37 | 55 |
| Both Germany and allies | 5 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 15 | 21 | 14 | 20 |
| No German responsibility | 20* | 44 | 8 | 13 | 2* | 2 | 4 | 6 |
| Total % | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | |
| No. of cases | (25) | | (103) | | (549) | | (767) | |
| Not ratable | 56 | | 40 | | 28 | | 32 | |
| Total % | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | |
| No. of cases | (57) | | (322) | | (751) | | (1130) | |

* Critical ratio of difference between ratings of no German responsibility ("Black" and "White") is 3.4.

dividual comment. The following quotations suggest a few of the points about which respondents felt uncomfortable, even though they did not often state that it was their personal responsibility to try to change the situation.

"The Party was too radical in its treatment of Jews. The world was bound to avenge such misdeeds. Germany lost the war because of injustice within."

"I think we must pay reparations. That is our obligation. Once we knew of the concentration camps, there would have been unrest and rebellion even if Germany had won."

"I expected your soldiers to be ruder to our population. We certainly deserved it."

"When Coventry had 30,000 dead because of our bombing what else could we expect (but to be bombed). Many people celebrated here after they heard what happened to Coventry and it was only just that these people be repaid for their evil feelings."

"Did I blame the Allies? No. I said it was only their retaliation for our heavy bombing of London, Coventry and other places. We started the war and they weren't even ready when we began to bomb them. It is only natural for them to hit back."

"I was in France as a railroad worker and was billeted with a private French family. They treated me very well, much better than you could imagine. I would volunteer to help rebuild France because if it weren't for the Germans, France wouldn't be so much destroyed." (At the end of the interview this man inquired where he might register for work in France.)

"It was a dishonest war, I believe. All Germans must suffer for the misdeeds of the Nazis."

NAZI PSYCHOSES

Many attempts have been made to diagnose the troubled history of the German people in terms of psychiatric disorder²² and there is some historical

evidence to support the notion that German culture has its neurotic characteristics which have led Germany and the world into many difficulties. There has been little to indicate, however, the extent to which certain official attitudes are really characteristic of individual Germans. The present material suggests a few comments on this issue.

Some of the tell-tale characteristics, that have been commented on by people such as Brickner, do show up even in a study that was not designed primarily to uncover such information. Suspicions and resentments, projection of hate to the Allies, and rationalization of defeat are all there. There too are reactions that might be interpreted as delusions of persecution. But these traits are found most frequently in the present study among those who are identified as Nazis.

When the question was asked, "What in your opinion was the chief cause of the war?", 25 per cent of Nazis and two per cent of non-Nazis said it was unfair treatment of Germany by the Allies (blocking Lebensraum, Versailles Treaty, etc.). Seven per cent Nazis and one per cent non-Nazis said Germany had to fight to defend herself. Moreover, the atmosphere of unreality which pervades the narratives of many of the Nazi respondents is almost incredible. Over and over they testify to having seen fact and propaganda conflict; promises of no bombing, promises of secret weapons, promises that the war would be short, promises of retaliation raids, all unfulfilled, and yet they believed in victory, some of them to the day the Allied troops marched into their towns, and at the time of the Survey they continued to protest belief in the Nazi leaders and in the Nazi news and views. These do sound like the systematized delusions of a

²² See for example: Brickner, R. M., *Is Germany Incurable?* Lippincott, 1913; Schumann, F. L., *Hitler and the Nazi Dictatorship*, Robert Hale, 1936; Dollard, J., *et al.*, *Frustration and Aggression*, Yale Univ. Press, 1939.

paranoid, though caution must be exercised in identifying irrational behavior of a whole group with the departure of an individual from what is accepted as normal behavior in the group. The private character of the delusions of a paranoid may be a critical feature of the diagnosis,²³ and the Nazis were conforming to certain cultural realities, if not to physical realities.

In any case, the evidence from the Survey does not support the extension of this or any other diagnosis to the whole population. The average German did see the contradiction in the promises and the reality: many put two and two together and testified to the inevitability of their being bombed after the much publicized bombing of enemy cities. They usually gave little evidence of a personal sense of responsibility but they saw the justice of Allied retaliation and often admitted to Germany's share of the guilt. This does not mean that such people present no problems or that they are blameless but it does imply that no simple diagnosis and no single treatment can be applied to the nation as a whole.²⁴

Although application of the test of Nazi loyalty to the sample has apparently distilled out a concentrate of problems, it must not be assumed that even this group was altogether homogeneous.²⁵ Many sorts of people became Nazis for a great many reasons, as has been suggested in Part I, and these differences must not be neglected. The opportunist is there in

many interviews, the person who saw the way the wind was blowing and set his sails accordingly with full knowledge of what he was doing. The disillusioned Nazi is there too, cynical and critical, and these are special problems. The Nazi who found his personal salvation in the movement often remains loyal. The upper class sympathizer regrets the "crudities" of many Nazi policies but shares the dangerous Nazi concepts of the superiority of certain favored beings.

The same great differences are present in the non-Nazi group, which ranges from genuine believers in democracy to helpless, confused non-entities who were not Nazis because they would never take a positive stand on any issue.

DID NAZIS SHOW CONCERN FOR COMMUNITY PROBLEMS?

It is not surprising to find that the hates and loyalties of the Nazis as a group out-last the war and that in the face of problems of the occupation, there was a tendency to return to these allegiances rather than to abandon them. These reactions were evidently deep-rooted emotionally and are likely to remain typical of many Nazis.

There are, on the other hand, certain characteristics that might have been expected to result from Nazi training and indoctrination which do not appear to be significantly more typical of Nazis than of non-Nazis. For many years the Party emphasized the slogan: "Community interest ranks above self-interest" and made great efforts to instill this doctrine, which has sometimes been pointed to as a healthy feature of the Nazi movement. There can be no doubt that some Nazis were fanatically self-sacrificing and that for many there was an identification of self-interest with Party, if not national

²³ This suggestion was made by Dr. Daniel Katz.

²⁴ The implications of these facts about German attitudes for occupation problems is discussed in an article by the author: Peak, H., Some Psychological Problems in the Re-education of Germany, *Journal of Social Issues*, 1946, Vol. 2, No. 3.

²⁵ See Schreier, E., German Aggressiveness—Its Reasons and Types, *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 1943, 38, 211-24.

interest, so that even dying for the cause was considered a privilege. The question that is important now is whether evidence can be found that this highly developed group loyalty has broadened and socialized the outlook of the adherents of the Nazi cause, so that when these people are discussing the occupation or war-time experiences, more of them than non-Nazis expressed concern about general group problems rather than about small personal concerns.

It need not be argued here whether this is really the kind of goal the Nazis had in mind when they set out to produce people who put community interest above self-interest. Certainly they were not seeking to encourage mature and independent insight into community problems. The slogan has, however, sometimes misled persons who have seen in this Nazi appeal to community interest and the techniques for accomplishing this end, a pattern which democracy should imitate. The question is not, then, "Did the Nazis get what they wanted when they built fanatical group loyalties," but, "Is there any evidence that the kind of community interests that were developed are desirable for citizens of a democracy?"

Obviously, this question cannot be answered finally by any one study. Since, however, the interviews covered many different subjects under circumstances where the respondent not only had full opportunity to express his concerns and interests but was urged to do so, it is not unreasonable to think that differences of this sort between the Nazis and non-Nazis had a good chance to emerge just as they did where group loyalties and resentments were concerned.

A sample of interviews was examined for evidences on the kinds of problems

that the respondents were most interested in discussing. Five hundred interviews had been previously selected at random and specially rated by a group of social scientists for degree of Nazi identification of the respondent.²⁶ These same interviews were used for the present analysis. They were first separated into groups on the basis of the amount of bombing experienced and the degree of Nazi identification. Equal numbers of Nazis and non-Nazis were then selected at random from each group with a given amount of bombing. This was done in order to make sure that any differences in concern between Nazis and non-Nazis could not be attributed to a difference in bombing experience. The subsample drawn in this manner contained 190 interviews.

Each of these interviews was then rated by the author on a three step scale:²⁷

1. Primarily concerned with personal problems.
2. Equal concern with personal and community problems.
3. Great concern with community problems.

The judgments were based both on what the respondents talked about and what they said on the subject. For example, general discussion of problems of unemployment was considered less personal than a remark, "I don't think the occupation is good because I have lost my job." Concern about the destruction and reconstruction of German cities would appear to be less personal than a comment, "The future looks bad because I have no house to live in." General discussions of economic and political ques-

²⁶ See Part III for a description of this special coding on Nazi identification.

²⁷ The ratings were made without knowledge of the rating on Nazi identification.

TABLE 33
Personal concerns in Nazis and non-Nazis
(Percentages)

| | Nazis | non-Nazis |
|-------------------------|-------|-----------|
| Primarily personal | 56 | 49 |
| About equal concerns | 36 | 41 |
| Great community concern | 8 | 10 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | 89 | (88) |

tions were judged to involve a community concern.

Because a respondent often commented on some topics from a purely personal point of view and on others in a more general fashion, a tally was kept of the personal or non-personal character of each topic discussed and a calculation made of the percentage of personal comment over the whole interview. If 75 per cent or more items were rated as personal, the interview was classified in group one above; with 25 to 75 per cent, in group two; zero to 25 per cent, in group three.

Obviously the respondents talked predominantly about their personal problems. The differences between Nazis and others are small,²⁸ though actually a

²⁸ In view of the highly stratified nature of the sample, there is doubt as to the appropriateness of the usual statistical tests for reliability.

slightly greater percentage of Nazis falls in the personal concern group. It is safe to conclude that as far as the present evidence goes, those who embraced the Nazi cause manifested no greater preoccupation with community problems than did other Germans. There is no evidence here that the Nazis held the secret of how to indoctrinate a nation in socially conscious attitudes which could survive the chaos of defeat.

WERE NAZIS CONCERNED WITH POLITICAL PROBLEMS?

Closely related to the problems which have just been discussed is the question of political consciousness in various segments of the German population. This is a somewhat more narrowly defined concept which overlaps the rating described as degree of preoccupation with personal affairs but which is not identical with the latter. There are, for example, cases in the interview material where persons showed little interest in political matters but still manifested concern for the fate of other people in the city or state or nation.

The 500 interviews mentioned in the foregoing section were judged and rated by a group of social scientists, not only

TABLE 34
Political interests as related to Nazi identification
(Percentages)

| | Strong identifica- tion | Moderate identifica- tion | Passive acceptance | Moderate rejection | Strong rejection | Total |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-------|
| Politics are not his concern | 26 | 50 | 73 | 44 | 20 | 40 |
| Politics are his concern | 42 | 10 | 5 | 10 | 30 | 18 |
| Not ratable | 32 | 34 | 22 | 37 | 14 | 33 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | 31 | 107 | 110 | 133 | 30 | 410 |

for Nazism but also for the presence or absence of political concern. The interviews were classified in three categories:

1. Feels political decisions and actions are not his concern or that he is futile in determining political decisions and actions.
2. Feels political decisions and actions are his concern.
3. No rating possible.

Here again there is little difference in Nazis and those opposed to National Socialism. Very similar percentages in the two groups were judged to be unconcerned with politics: 26 per cent for both those who were strongly identified with and for those who strongly rejected the Nazis.

The present study yields no specific information about the nature of the political interests of those who were judged to have such interests. It is certain, however, that concern with policies of the Nazi regime (either approval or disapproval) was one important source of evidence for making this rating. It is inevitable, therefore, that there should be some correlation between degree of identification as a Nazi or non-Nazi and interest in politics. Since National Socialism was a political movement, those who violently espoused or rejected it must necessarily have been more conscious of political matters than those who took a less definite stand on the Party and its policies.

These findings, like the others, support the impression that Nazis do not stand out from the rest of the population in the breadth of their outlook and interests. A large proportion of them as of all the groups, reflects the indifference of the average German toward political matters. About half the sample dis-

claimed interest in such problems, and another third made so little political comment, that they could not be rated.

SUMMARY

1. In the first summer of surrender the hopes and fears, resentments and concerns of the German people were far from homogenous, for Nazis and non-Nazis differed markedly. In the group as a whole, however, the pattern of attitudes came nearer to that of the non-Nazis.

2. Most Germans either resented the German leaders *or* the Allies, not both. The evidence suggests that a generalized attitude of acceptance or lack of acceptance of the Nazi doctrine lies behind this result.

3. Though Nazis lost confidence in the competence and intentions of their leaders during the course of the war, they were much less inclined than the non-Nazis to blame them (particularly the political leaders) for the war's outcome. They blamed the Allies for the bombing and by July a majority was critical of the occupation. Moreover, some seemed to project their own hate onto the Allies, commenting on the Allied hatred of Germany. The Nazis not only felt little personal guilt for the war but rarely expressed the opinion that Germany as a nation was to blame.

4. Non-Nazis, on the other hand, tended to turn their resentments on the German leaders and to accept Allied bombing as an inevitable feature of war for which the Allies were not to blame. They too gave little evidence of a feeling of personal guilt for the war but did recognize Germany's guilt more frequently than did the Nazis.

5. It is concluded that the alleged paranoid-like characteristics of the Ger-

man people are most evident among the Nazis, but that care must be taken in making too much of the similarity between the irrational behavior of a group and the symptoms of the individual paranoid deviating from group standards of behavior.

6. A large proportion of the sample studied revealed great preoccupation with personal problems and little interest in political matters. There was no evi-

dence of a greater concern with group problems among the Nazis than the non-Nazis.

7. In every case where clear differences have been found between Nazis and non-Nazis, an intermediate group falling between the extremes in Naziness takes an intermediate position in the frequency with which a given attitude is expressed. There is no sharp dividing line in the population on any of these measures.

PART III

THE IDENTIFICATION OF NAZIS

AS ALREADY indicated, the Germans who were interviewed were identified as Nazis by two methods. The interviewers rated each person on the basis of the ideas and loyalties which he expressed in his answers and comments; then at the end of the interview inquiries were made about the Party organizations of which the respondent had been a member.

In this section the classification of Naziness made by these two methods will be compared. Because of the importance attached to membership in Party organizations as a method of identifying Nazis, it will be useful to know how well this method serves to distinguish persons with Nazi ideology.

Since the interviewers sometimes knew about Party affiliations at the time they made the ratings on ideology, the two classifications may show more agreement than they would if ratings had been based exclusively on the ideas expressed. In order to obtain a more accurate measure of the relation of the two criteria, judgments made by a group of social scientists who read a sample of interviews without reference to Party affiliations of the respondent will also be compared with classifications of the same individuals on the basis of Party membership.

TO WHAT EXTENT WERE PARTY MEMBERSHIP AND NAZI IDEOLOGY RELATED?

Affiliation with Party organizations is related to Nazi sympathies (as rated by interviewers) but it is not an infallible clue. In both Tables 35 and 36 the percentage of persons belonging to Party organizations is clearly highest among

those identified as being definitely Nazi in ideology.²⁹ But only 58 per cent of those who were identified as extreme Nazis by their ideas ("Black") reported having belonged to some Nazi organization. Moreover, nine per cent of those who gave no evidence of Nazi sympathies ("White") were members of Nazi organizations. In other words, here is evidence for the contention often heard that belonging to Party groups is not a wholly satisfactory basis for identifying Nazis.

TABLE 35
Membership in Nazi organizations and Nazi ideology (interviewer rating)
(Percentages)

| | Black | Gray | White |
|--------------|-------|--------|--------|
| Member | 58 | 30 | 9 |
| Not a Member | 42 | 70 | 91 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (265) | (1019) | (2090) |

TABLE 36
Membership in NSDAP and Nazi ideology (interviewer rating)
(Percentages)

| | Black | Gray | White |
|--------------|-------|--------|--------|
| NSDAP* | 37 | 14 | 3 |
| Not NSDAP | 63 | 86 | 97 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (265) | (1019) | (2090) |

* NSDAP refers to the German National Socialist Worker's Party which was the original Nazi organization and open only to specially selected membership.

When these facts are put in terms of proportion of the whole sample, the following facts emerge.

²⁹ Membership in Hitler Jugend and Bund Deutscher Maedel are not included. These were Nazi youth organizations for boys and girls respectively.

TABLE 37
Distribution of interviewer ratings of
Naziness and party affiliations
(Percentages)

| | Black | Gray | White | Total % |
|--------------|-------|------|-------|------------|
| Member | 5 | 9 | 6 | 20 |
| Not a Member | 3 | 21 | 56 | 80 |
| Total % | 8 | 30 | 62 | 100 |

These results suggest that membership in Nazi organizations is a misleading index of the outlook of the individual in three per cent of the sample who were not reported to be members but were rated as "Black"; the evidence is somewhat doubtful in 21 per cent who were not members but rated as "Gray". Furthermore, the six per cent who admitted to being members but were identified as "White" would be misjudged by a policy which took into account only Party membership.

The relationship between membership and interviewers' ratings on ideology may be expressed in terms of correlations.³⁰ By one method those rated as "Gray" are counted as Nazis along with "Black", and the "White" form the non-Nazi group. By the other method the intermediate "Gray" group is omitted entirely so that the relation is indicated

³⁰ Tetrachoric correlations.

between those who were both Party members and "Blacks" and those who were not Party members and were "White". A moderate amount of relation appears in both cases: $+.57$ in the first, and $+.70$ in the second. The higher correlation which results when the intermediate group is left out is to be expected, for these people are not strictly Nazis or non-Nazis and throwing them either way makes for more errors.

A sub-sample of interviews, selected from the total sample at random, was classified into the following categories by a group of social scientists, who made no reference to the respondent's Party affiliations while judging his Nazi identification:

Attitudes toward Nazism

1. Strong identification.
2. Moderate identification.
3. Passive acceptance, indifference.
4. Moderate rejection.
5. Strong rejection.

Table 38 shows the correspondence between these judgments of Naziness and membership in Party organizations.

Here the lack of correspondence between membership and ratings of ideology is even greater than in Table 37. Eighteen per cent of the sample were rated as strong or moderate Nazis but

TABLE 38
Special coders' ratings of Naziness and party affiliation
(Percentages)

| | Member | Not a member | Total % |
|-------------------------|--------|--------------|---------------|
| Strong identification | 5 | 2 | 7 |
| Moderate identification | 7 | 16 | 23 |
| Passive acceptance | 4 | 23 | 27 |
| Moderate rejection | 5 | 28 | 33 |
| Strong rejection | * | 10 | 10 |
| Total % | 21 | 70 | 100 (N = 400) |

* Less than 0.5 per cent.

were not members of Nazi organizations, while between five and six per cent of the sample admitted membership but were judged not to be Nazi in outlook. This difference from Table 37 suggests that the interviewers were influenced in their ratings not only by the ideas expressed but also by the fact that the individuals admitted affiliation with the Party.

Expressed in terms of correlations this relationship between coder ratings and membership is only moderate and considerably lower than that between interviewer rating and membership. The correlation is $+ .50$.

HOW DID INTERVIEWERS AND SPECIAL CODERS AGREE ON NAZI IDENTIFICATION?

In Table 39 the ratings made by the special coders are compared to the judg-

mine what groups were included in the "Black", "White", and "Gray" classifications of the interviewers. The category "Black" included principally those persons judged by coders to show "strong Nazi identification" (62 per cent). Ninety-six per cent of "Blacks" were classed as *either* "strong or moderate Nazis". More than one-third of the "Grays" were judged "passive and indifferent" by the coders and this group also included more Nazis (45 per cent) than non-Nazis (19 per cent). The "Whites" consisted of 60 per cent non-Nazis ("strong" plus "moderate"), 25 per cent who passively accepted Nazism, 14 per cent "moderate" Nazis, and one per cent "strong" Nazis.

It is clear from these results that the interviewers were more lenient in their classifications than were the coders. This difference in the two series of judgments

TABLE 39
Interviewer and coder ratings
(Percentages)

| | Black | Gray | White | Total |
|----------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Strong Nazi identification | 62 | 6 | 1 | 7 |
| Moderate Nazi identification | 34 | 39 | 14 | 23 |
| Passive acceptance, indifference | 2 | 36 | 25 | 27 |
| Moderate rejection | 2 | 18 | 44 | 33 |
| Strong rejection | 0 | 1 | 16 | 10 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| No. of cases | (36) | (134) | (256) | (426) |

ments of the same respondents made at the end of the interview.

The evidence indicates that coders and interviewers agree more closely on identification of Nazis than either does with identification by Party affiliations. There is, then, a high degree of consistency in independent judgments of degree of Naziness based on the ideas expressed in the interviews.

This table makes it possible to deter-

illustrates the familiar fact that it is easier to make consistent judgments about relative positions of individuals on a scale than to agree on an absolute statement such as, "This person is a Nazi and that one is not". So the coders and interviewers agreed reasonably well on which persons were more Nazi in their attitude and which less Nazi but they differed somewhat on where to draw the line between Nazis and non-Nazis. This

TABLE 40
Distribution of agreements and disagreements between coder and interviewer ratings
(Percentages)

| Interviewer judgment | Coder judgment | | | | | Totals |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| | Strong identifica- tion | Moderate identifica- tion | Passive acceptance | Moderate rejection | Strong rejection | |
| Black | 5 | 3 | * | * | 0 | 8 |
| Gray | 2 | 12 | 11 | 6 | * | 31+ |
| White | * | 8 | 15 | 26 | 10 | 59 |
| Total % | 7+ | 23 | 26+ | 32+ | 10+ | 100 (N = 426) |

* Less than 0.5 per cent.

is inevitable where attitudes exist with greater or less intensity. Most people are not wholly Nazi or non-Nazi. Many of them show evidences of National Socialist ideology on some issues and of opposition to this view on others. Any clear-cut division into groups must inevitably be arbitrary, and the dividing line can only be determined on the basis of the specific practical demands of the situation. For example, persons fairly high up the scale of Naziness might be used satisfactorily for some types of supervised work, whereas the same level of Naziness would be inappropriate for more independent and responsible jobs.

The locus of disagreement between coders and interviewers can best be seen in Table 40 which shows the distribution of judgments made by coder and interviewer.

There are very few people involved in disagreements at the extremes. Perhaps the only notably serious misjudgments were the eight per cent that were labelled "White" by interviewers and "Moderate Nazi" by coders. Less than 0.5 per cent were misjudged as "White" and "Strong Nazi" and none were judged "Black" and "Strong Rejection". Less than 0.5 per cent were judged "Black" and "Moderate Rejection".

The degree of relationship between coder and interviewer ratings may be summarized and expressed in terms of correlation coefficients as was done in comparing the ratings and the classification by Party membership. The correlations have been calculated when the intermediate groups (Gray and passive acceptance of Nazism) are omitted and also when they are combined with the other categories.³¹ When only extreme classes are used the relationship between coder and interviewer ratings is +.90. When intermediate categories are included in the correlations, the relationship is less perfect, +.65—a clear difference though in the expected direction.

Comparing these results with the correlations between interviewer ratings and classifications by Party membership (Table 41), it is clear that there is more agreement between the completely independent ratings of ideas made by coders and interviewers than there is between interviewer or coder ratings of ideas and classification based on admissions of Party membership.

³¹ "Gray" has been combined with "Black" and "passive" with "rejection" in one case and with "acceptance of Nazism" in the other. The correlation is the same with these different combinations.

TABLE 41

Tetrachoric correlations between methods of identifying Nazis (intermediate categories omitted)

| | Coder judgment | Party membership |
|----------------------|----------------|------------------|
| Interviewer judgment | + .00 | + .70 |
| Coder judgment | | + .50 |

HOW DID THE INTERVIEWERS IDENTIFY NAZIS?

A systematic examination of the actual comments made by people who were classified as "Black" and "White" by the interviewers suggests that attitudes toward the Nazi Party and toward certain Nazi-approved ideas were very consistently taken into account in making ratings.

As already indicated, the respondents were permitted and encouraged to talk freely as they answered each question. Such comments were recorded by the interviewers. When the interviews were read later, comments containing useful information were classified (coded), even though they were only indirectly related to the question asked. Each of these classifications was listed and represented by a code number. It was possible, therefore, to determine both the available types of comments which had to do with Nazi attitudes and the number of persons making such comments. There proved to be 41 items on the code list which bore on Nazi attitudes. When a comparison was made between the percentage of "Black" and "White" who made each type of statement, it was clear that more of the former made favorable statements about Nazis and refrained from critical remarks, while more of the latter criticized. On 90 per cent of the relevant items the percentages are in the expected direction. So, for example, in

answering questions on air-raid experiences, such as "How did you fare at that time (of raids)? How did you feel?", comments were often made incidentally which indicated resentment of leaders. Such comment was made by seven per cent of "Black" and 16 per cent of "White", which is what would be expected if the "Black"- "White" classifications were based in part on such answers.³² Two items of the 41 (items 8 and 10 in Appendix A) yielded the same percentages for "Black" and "White" and two (9 and 13) reversed expectations.³³ On these deviant items neither difference was statistically reliable.

It is important to notice that Nazis differed from non-Nazis not only on the answers to questions referring definitely to the Party but also on free and unsolicited comments. For example, when respondents were asked about air-raid experiences, there was no necessity of making any critical comment on the Party but the non-Nazis made such comments more frequently than Nazis did. Here we have the basis of a distinction between the two groups even when the

³² The questions, comments, and percentages making comment are presented in Appendix A.

³³ Three of the four items yielding contradictory results are derived from the question, "How do you think you and your family would have fared during the next three or four years if Germany had won?" It will be noticed that Items 5, 6 and 7 (Appendix A) were also comments on this question and that there the "Whites" all greatly exceed Nazis in critical comments. If all comments on this question had been coded as either "critical" or "not critical of the regime" and the general result reported, the exceptions would not have occurred. As a result of splitting up comments on this one question into so many classes, the number of cases is small in each and the results less reliable. Whether the other inconsistent item (13) is really inconsistent is a matter of judgment. More Nazis than non-Nazis lost confidence in leaders, but there were more to lose confidence. Moreover, despite the disillusionment of a greater number of Nazis, more retained belief in their leaders to the end.

Nazis chose to say nothing about the Party. Silence on certain issues becomes, therefore, just as important as positive comment. This is a potentially useful technique in distinguishing Nazis and non-Nazis even under circumstances where frankness is not to be expected.

There is additional evidence that other typical Nazi attitudes have entered into the classification of respondents as Nazi and non-Nazi. The Nazis mentioned more frequently than did the non-Nazis many of the standard Nazi propaganda lines, such as, fear of Russia and Communists, belief in new weapons for Germany's salvation, reliability of Nazi information sources, Allied "terror attacks", Jews outside Germany as a cause of war, and territorial problems such as the Polish Corridor as a cause of war.

This sort of evidence suggests considerable internal consistency in the data, and provides a suggestion of how interviewers actually made their judgments.

DID THE GERMANS TELL THE TRUTH ABOUT PARTY MEMBERSHIP?

There was a reasonable doubt whether the Germans who were interviewed would give honest replies to the questions regarding their membership in Party organizations. Since they were asked to specify the organizations which they had joined, it was possible to make an estimate of the NSDAP membership in Germany from the answers obtained and to check this estimate against the published figures of Party membership. This constitutes a validity check of the results.³⁵

Reports of the content of the personnel files of the National Socialist Labor

Party which were found in Munich after the war's end indicate that there were approximately seven million NSDAP members in Greater Germany.³⁵ Since the Party maintained the policy until July 1944 that persons enlisting in the Army should be suspended from active membership, there is some question whether this figure includes members of the Armed Forces who were or had been Party members. It is almost certain that some had been placed on the lists after July 1944 and likely that other names were never removed.

This same estimate of seven million NSDAP members was given by the British in 1944.³⁶ This figure appears to have been based on data from Düsseldorf where 8.8 per cent of the population were reported to be Party members. Taking the population of Greater Germany as 79 million, and applying this percentage, produced the figure of seven million. This estimate clearly included all Germans in and out of the Armed Forces and assumed that the percentage of NSDAP members in the wartime population of the city represented the percentage in the Armed Forces and elsewhere in Germany. It may be true that the percentage was the same for soldiers as for non-combatant men but it is clearly not true that the proportion of NSDAP members was the same among the men of Germany and among the total population, for many more men than women were admitted. If it is assumed that there were 69 million civilians, the estimate of NSDAP civilian members based on the Düsseldorf figure would be about six million.

If NSDAP members in the Armed Forces are omitted, the Survey estimate

³⁵ The limitations of the predictions made from the data are discussed in Appendix B.

³⁶ *New York Times*, October 18, 1945, p. 13.

³⁷ Source restricted.

of civilian members in Greater Germany comes to 5,646,000. This is close to the six million civilian membership estimated from the British figures on Dusseldorf. Inclusion of an estimate of NSDAP members in the Armed Forces brings the Survey figure to 8,006,000, no allowance being made for withdrawal from the Party on entering the Army.

The seven million estimate reported from Party personnel files lies, therefore, between the Survey estimate of civilian membership (5,646,000) and an estimated total membership, when persons in the Armed Forces are included, of 8,006,000. This is just what would be expected if the names of some were removed from the official lists on entering the Army, if some soldier names remained on, and if others had been added since July, 1944. From the information available at the present time, this seems to be the correct interpretation of the composition of the official lists.³⁷

In either case, the estimates come closer to the actual count than might have been anticipated and the results do not suggest that any large proportion of the respondents attempted to lie when asked about Party membership.³⁸

SUMMARY

1. Estimates of the number of NSDAP members derived from the Bombing Survey came sufficiently close to the number

of Party members listed officially to suggest that in the summer of 1945 the German people were reasonably frank in admitting Party membership.

2. Even then, however, before the effects of the de-Nazification policy were altogether clear, admitted Party membership was not satisfactory as a method of identifying Nazis. Some showed themselves to possess Nazi ideas who denied belonging to the Party and others appeared to be less Nazi in sympathy who admitted Party membership. Reliance on admissions of Party affiliation have almost certainly become less reliable as time has elapsed and the penalties of such admissions become clear.

3. It has proven possible to make very consistent ratings of degree of Naziness based on the ideas expressed during interviews. Many of these revealing attitudes emerged incidentally in answers to questions which asked nothing about Nazi loyalty. There is less agreement, however, about the point at which you begin to call a person a Nazi. This is an arbitrary matter which will vary with the specific purpose for which the identification is being made.

4. Certain practical suggestions are implicit in these results:

a. Many basic loyalties and opinions can be got at indirectly even when there is an attempt made to cover up such attitudes. Attitudes are much less easily camouflaged than is a criterion of Naziness such membership in the Party. It may be necessary to make increasing practical use of indirect methods of identifying Nazis. The questions that would be recommended for this purpose at the present time would obviously not be the ones used in the Bombing Survey. They would require complete revision to meet the requirements of

³⁷ See, "Are there 'Good' Nazis?" published in Weekly Information Bulletin of Military Government, No. 37, April 15, 1946, for evidence that after 1939 even during periods when Party lists were "closed" to members, exceptions were made for HJ and BDM, honorably discharged members of the Wehrmacht who had distinguished themselves in service . . . and soldiers still in service who had proved themselves good National Socialists.

³⁸ The detailed procedure on which these estimates are based will be found in Appendix B.

the changed situation. It is suggested that the general method employed seems to lend itself to such a purpose.

b. People may be arranged with considerable consistency on a scale for degree of Nazi ideology but arbitrary judgments must be made about the point at which to draw the line between Nazis and non-Nazis. It is suggested that

in the practical situation the people selected as Nazis will depend on the purpose of selection. If a person is being chosen for one kind of job the degree of Naziness to be tolerated will be less than in another situation. These levels of tolerance obviously require special analysis and standardization.

APPENDIX A

COMMENTS ON THE NAZI PARTY

THIS table contains the following information: (1) the question asked, which yielded comment on the Nazi Party and its leaders; (2) the comments that were made by respondents either in direct answer to the questions or as incidental remarks volunteered as evi-

dence for, or explanation of some statement; (3) the percentage of those identified as "Black" (Nazis) who made each statement; and (4) the percentage of the "Whites" (non-Nazis) making the statement.

TABLE 42
Relation of ratings on Nazi identification and comments on Nazi party

| Questions | Comments made in course of answering questions | Percentage making comment among:*** | |
|---|---|-------------------------------------|-------|
| | | Black | White |
| How is it going with you under the occupation? | 1. Expected freedom from Nazi oppression (Base: those expression an opinion) | 1.0* | 22.0 |
| Is it better or worse than you expected? | 2. Conditions are unfavorable because treatment of Nazis is too favorable (Base: those saying conditions were unfavorable) | 0.5* | 6.5 |
| What did you really expect? | | | |
| How do you think your family will fare in the next three or four years? | 3. Bad, I fear that Nazi Party will get into power again (Base: those saying will fare badly) | 0.0** | 2.0 |
| | 4. Partly good, partly bad; bad economically, good because of freedom from Nazis (Base: those saying partly good, partly bad) | 0.0** | 6.5 |
| How do you think you and your family would have fared in the next three or four years if Germany had won? | 5. It would have been bad | 25.0* | 85.0 |
| | 6. Bad because I would have suffered harm as a non-Nazi | 7.5* | 29.0 |
| | 7. Bad because I didn't belong to the Party | 0.0* | 11.5 |
| | 8. Bad, I was doing badly under Nazis; would have continued | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| | 9. Bad, Nazi oppressions of free speech; Nazis fatten own pockets | 39.0 | 31.0 |
| | 10. Bad because Nazis are terrible people, did terrible things in prison camps, etc. (Base 6-10: those saying would have fared badly) | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| How did you fare at time of raids? | 11. Resentment of leaders indicated | 7.0** | 16.0 |
| What were your experiences? (at time of raids) | 12. Glad that Nazi government was beginning to crack | 0.0* | 4.5 |
| What did you do? | (Base: those expressing feelings) | | |
| What were your feelings then and how did you react? | | | |

* Difference statistically reliable at 1% level.

** Difference statistically reliable at 5% level.

*** In some cases the base for percentages is not the total Nazi group or the total non-Nazi group. For example, in Item 2, Table 42, the percentages are based on the number of Nazis (or non-Nazis) saying *conditions were unfavorable*. The total Nazi group could not be used because more of them showed unfavorable reactions to the occupation than did non-Nazis. In Table 42 the base is indicated in parentheses in those cases where the total "Black" or "White" group has not been used.

TABLE 42—Continued

| Questions | Comments made in course of answering questions | Percentage making comment among:*** | |
|--|---|-------------------------------------|-------|
| | | Black | White |
| Were you more afraid as these raids continued or did you get used to them? | 13. Loss of faith in leadership | 3.0 | 1.0 |
| Did repeated raids have any other effect on your state of mind? | 14. Anger against Nazis, against government | 10.0* | 26.0 |
| | 15. Desire to have leaders share suffering | 0.0** | 1.0 |
| Did you ever come to a point because of air raids where you simply did not want to go on with the war? | 16. Was willing to surrender because only way to end national socialism (Base: those willing to surrender) | 0.0* | 5.0 |
| What did you think at that time of unconditional surrender? | | | |
| What in your opinion was the chief cause of the war? | 17. Hitler greed, his blunders, his gang, Nazi desire for power (Base: those giving causes) | 13.0* | 62.0 |
| | 18. Rating on war responsibility. Hitler or Nazis responsible (Base: those giving information on war responsibility) | 20.0* | 59.0 |
| Did you blame the Allies for air raids? | 19. No. Blamed Nazis (Base: those saying no) | 0.0* | 19.0 |
| | 20. Yes, but also blamed Nazis (Base: those saying yes) | 0.0* | 4.0 |
| In your opinion what did the Allies want to accomplish by these raids? | 21. Free the Germans from the Nazis (Base: those answering questions) | 0.0* | 5.0 |
| Did the newspapers and the radio correctly describe the general state of mind in the city after each air raid? | 22. People cursed Hitler because he would not end the war | 0.0 | 5.0 |
| | 23. Resentment against Party because of bad reporting (Base: those answering question) | 3.0* | 13.0 |
| What in your opinion is the chief reason Germany lost the war? | 24. Hitler | 3.0* | 6.0 |
| | 25. Bad leadership by Nazis (Base: those answering questions) | 24.0* | 33.0 |
| Was your leadership as good as had been expected? | 26. Political leaders always considered competent (Base: those giving opinion on change in attitude toward political leaders) | 35.0* | 2.0 |
| Is that your opinion for both the political and military leaders? | | | |
| What did you think about this shortly after the beginning of the war? | | | |
| During the war did you believe that your leaders wanted what was best for you? | 27. Yes (Base: those giving opinion) | 88.0* | 55.0 |
| How well handled were the problems which the war brought here at home? | 28. Satisfied (Base: those giving opinion) | 66.0* | 25.0 |
| At the beginning of the war did you expect that your life would be completely upset or did you think you would not be affected by the war? | 29. Decided later would be upset because suffered as result of political view (Base: those deciding later would be upset) | 0.0* | 2.0 |

TABLE 42—Continued

| Questions | Comments made in course of answering questions | Percentage making comment among:*** | |
|--|--|-------------------------------------|-------|
| | | Black | White |
| What was it that was hardest for the German civilians during the war? | 30. Loss of freedom and fear of Nazis | 0.0* | 3.0 |
| | 31. Injustice and barbarism put on people by Nazis (Base: those answering question) | 0.0* | 2.0 |
| During last year, did you reflect much on the state of the war or didn't you have time for that? What was the content of your thinking? | 32. Thought "Why don't the leaders stop the war?" | 2.0* | 6.0 |
| | 33. Thought: fear of Gestapo and Nazi regime | 0.0* | 4.0 |
| | 34. Thought: critical of leaders; they lied to us (Base 32-33; those describing thoughts) | 6.0* | 13.0 |
| Did you at any time during the war come to a point where you simply did not want to go on with the war? What brought you to this point? | 35. Yes; reached the point because of cruel treatment by Nazis (Base: those saying yes) | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| | 36. No; because had confidence in Hitler and leaders (Base: those saying no) | 5.0* | 1.0 |
| | 37. No; feared punishment by Gestapo, Nazis (Base: those saying no) | 4.0* | 29.0 |
| | 38. Yes; Party became too domineering, Nazis behaved cruelly (Base: those saying yes) | 3.0* | 9.0 |
| What did you think at that time of unconditional surrender? | 39. Yes approved, only way to end national socialism (Base: those saying yes) | 1.0* | 11.0 |
| How good were the special measures and welfare services after the raids? Was everything possible done? | 40. Services were good (Base: those answering question) | 81.0* | 49.0 |
| How did people of your circumstances get along in comparison with other groups of people? | 41. Worse, non-Party member discriminated against (Base: those saying they got along worse) | 25.0* | 51.0 |

APPENDIX B

ESTIMATES OF NSDAP MEMBERSHIP

IN MAKING estimates from the Survey material, the following facts about the sample have been taken into account.

1. Evacuees, persons with bombing experience and those who had not been bombed were sampled in different proportions. Separate estimates must therefore be made for each of these groups and added together.

2. The sample contained no fighting men. It will have to be assumed that these had the same proportion of NSDAP members as the non-combatant men in Germany.

3. Only individuals between 16 and 70 years of age were sampled. This means that the percentage of NSDAP found in the sample is a percentage of the age groups interviewed, not of the total population. According to the German census of 1939, 76 per cent of the population fell in the age range 16 years and up. If ten million soldiers were eliminated from the adult population, 72 per cent would have been adult civilians 16 years and above. This figure has been used to estimate the size of the adult civilian population, and assumes the same percentage of NSDAP for the age group 70 years and above.

4. The interviews were limited to persons in the British, French and American zones of occupation. The data from this area will be extrapolated to cover the remainder of Greater Germany. There is supplementary material on NSDAP membership in a sample of 600 cases from the American and French zones in Austria which shows a slightly higher percentage of Nazis than in the German sample (15 per cent as against 11.5 per cent), probably because western

Austria was the most Nazi part of the country. No interviews were conducted farther east than Linz. This suggests that using the German figure as the basis of estimates for Austria should yield a conservative value. The same is true for the Russian zone of occupation where NSDAP membership was heavier in the 1932 elections than in the remainder of Germany.

5. The absence of a representative sample from rural areas introduces the most serious difficulty. Some small towns were included in the sample but no systematic selection was made among the villages and rural populations. It has often been said that the Nazis were strongest in the rural areas.²⁹ This tends to be confirmed by certain evidence from the Survey. The unbombed towns were principally smaller towns while the bombed towns contained the larger cities. Fourteen per cent of the sample from the former and eight per cent from the latter were members of NSDAP. This suggests more Nazis in the smaller communities. Moreover, there were in the sample 67 persons who described themselves as farmers. Fifteen per cent of this number were NSDAP. The use of the data from small, unbombed towns to represent rural communities may result in some underestimation of NSDAP's in rural areas. It appears therefore that we should expect an underestimation, for all the errors are in that direction.

²⁹ Schreier, F. German Aggressiveness—Its Reasons and Types. *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 1913, 38, 213. See also Loomis, C. P. and Boegle, J. A. The Spread and Persistence of German Nationalism in Rural Areas. (Seen in manuscript.)

TABLE 43
Estimates of NSDAP membership

| | <i>Civilians</i> | NSDAP | Population |
|---|------------------|--|------------|
| AMERICAN, BRITISH, FRENCH ZONES | | | |
| Evacuees | | | |
| Total Adult Civilian Population..... | | | 2,532,000 |
| NSDAP (7.6%)..... | | 192,000 | |
| Bombed | | | |
| Total Adult Civilian Population..... | | | 7,958,000 |
| NSDAP (8.4%)..... | | 666,000 | |
| Unbombed | | | |
| Total Adult Civilian Population..... | | | 14,108,000 |
| NSDAP (14.0%)..... | | 1,975,000 | |
| <i>Total Adult Civilian Population (A-B-F Zone).....</i> | | | 24,598,000 |
| <i>NSDAP Total (A-B-F Zone).....</i> | | 2,833,000 = 11.5% of Adult Civilian Population | |
| RUSSIAN ZONE | | | |
| Bombed | | | |
| Total Adult Civilian Population..... | | | 11,576,000 |
| NSDAP (8.4%)..... | | 972,000 | |
| Unbombed | | | |
| Total Adult Civilian Population..... | | | 7,235,000 |
| NSDAP (14.0%)..... | | 1,009,000 | |
| <i>Total Adult Civilian Population (Russian).....</i> | | | 18,811,000 |
| <i>NSDAP Total (Russian Zone).....</i> | | 1,981,000 | |
| OTHER AREAS IN GREATER GERMANY | | | |
| Total Adult Civilian Population..... | | | 7,235,000 |
| NSDAP Total (11.5%)..... | | 832,000 | |
| TOTAL CIVILIAN ADULTS, GREATER GERMANY..... | | | 50,644,000 |
| TOTAL NSDAP (CIVILIANS)..... | | 5,646,000 | |
| <i>Armed Forces</i> | | | |
| Total..... | | | 10,000,000 |
| NSDAP Total..... | | 2,360,000 | |
| (NSDAP among Men = 23.6%*) | | | |
| <i>Grand Total NSDAP, Civilian & Armed Forces NSDAP.....</i> | | 8,006,000 | |
| <i>Grand Total Adults (16 & up) Civilians & Armed Forces.....</i> | | | 60,644,000 |

* In a study of 270 prisoners of war in April 1945, 27 per cent indicated approval when asked the question, "What do you think of National Socialism?" This is obviously not the same as saying they belonged to NSDAP but suggests that the figure estimated for membership among the Armed Forces might not be off too much in indicating potential members. The value used to estimate NSDAP members in the Armed Forces is the percentage of NSDAP among the men in the Survey sample.

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